1. For Gregory says in Dialogorum 2 where he speaks of this vision, that “All creation becomes insignificant for a soul that sees the Creator.” But to see God is to see the divine essence. Therefore, the blessed Benedict saw the divine essence.

2. Further, Gregory adds in the same place that “He saw the whole world in the divine light.” But there is no other light or radiance of God than God himself, as Gregory says and as the Glossa on Exodus 33:20, “No man will see me and live,” says. Therefore, the blessed Benedict saw God through the divine essence.

But to the contrary: John 1:18 says. “No man has seen God at any time.” The Glossa says on this that “No one living in mortal flesh can sec God’s essence.”

1. St. Benedict of Nursia, ca. 480-550, established the first monastic communities in the West and built the famous monastery at Monte Cassino where he wrote his Rule for religious life. See the article “St. Benedict’ by J. Mallet in The New Caiholic Encyclopedja (New York, 1967), vol. 2.

2. Gregory the Great, Dialogorum Libri IV, 2, c. 35, cd. U. Moricca (Rome, 1924); PL 66: 200.

3. Ibid.

4. Glossa ordinaria, (Exod. 33), Biblia sacra cum glossis ... Lyre (No place, 1588), 1: 203; Gregory the Great, Moralia 18, C. 54; cc 143A: 953, no. 90. unes 97-98; pi. 76: 93.

5. Glossa ordinaria (Iohannis Cap. 1), 5: 188b.

I answer: it must be said that. according to Wisdom 9:15, “A perishable body weighs the soul down. However, the highest elevation of the human mind is the attainment of a Vision of the divine essence. So it is impossible for a human mind united to a body to see God’s essence unless, as Augustine says in Super Genesim ad litteram 12, a man is entirely dead to this mortal life or is so separated from his senses that he does not know whether he is in or outside his body, as we read concerning Paul in 2 Cor. 12:3.6 However, when he had that vision the blessed Benedict was neither entirely dead to this life nor separated from his bodily senses, which is clear from the fact that while remaining in the same vision he summoned another person to see the same thing as Gregory relates. So it is clear that he did not see God’s essence.

Therefore. to the first it must be said that Gregory means in those words to argue from a kind of proportion. For if the ones who see God’s essence reckon all creation insignificant in comparison, it is not astonishing if the blessed Benedict could see something more through the divine light than men commonly see.

To the second it must be said that sometimes God himself is called the light of God, sometimes another light derived from God is called this, according to Psalm 36 (35)9, “In your light we shah see the light.” Here, however, it means the light derived from God.

6 Augustine, De Genesi ad litleram 12, c. 27, ed. Jos. Zycha, C5EL 28: 422; PL 34:

***

QUESTION 2: There were two points of inquiry concerning the human nature in Christ:

1. Whether there is one sonship in Christ by which he is related to the Father and his mother, or two?

2. Whether Christ was dead on the cross?

Article 1: Whether there is one sonship in Christ by which he is related to the Father and his mother, or two?

Concerning the first we proceeded as follows: it seems that there are two sonships in Christ.

1. For when the causes of relations are multiplied, the relations are multiplied. However, generation is the cause of sonship. Therefore since the generation by which Christ was born eternally from the Father and that by which he was born temporally from his mother are diverse, the sonship by which he is related to the Father and that by which he is related to his mother will also be diverse.

2. Moreover, what receives an absolute property in time without changing can even more receive a relative property in time without changing. But the Son of God receives an absolute property in time without changing because on Luke 1:32, “He shall be great and shall be called Son of the Highest,” Ambrose says, “He will not therefore be great because he was not great before being born of the Virgin, but because the power which the Son of God has by nature the man was going to receive in time.”7 Therefore, even more could the Son of God receive a new sonship in time without changing. So two sonships are appropriate to him, one eternal and the other temporal.

But to the contrary: the unity of the cause which makes something such a thing makes it one such thing. But by sonship someone is a son, therefore by one sonship he is one son. Since Christ is one son and not two, there are not two sonships in him but one only.

I answer: it must be said that relations differ from all other categories of things in that those things which belong to other categories are real things from the very natures of their categories, as are quantities from the nature of quantity, and qualities from the nature of quality. But relations are not real things from the nature of relation. For we find certain relations which are not real but mental only. For example a knowable object is related to knowledge not by any real relation existing in the knowable object but rather because knowledge is related to the object, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysica 5 10. But the reality of a relation comes from its cause when one thing has a natural order to another. The natural and real order is for them the relation itself. So right and left in an animal are real relations because they follow certain natural powers; however, in a column they are mental relations only according to an animal’s position in relation to the column.

7. Glossa ordinaria (Lucae Cap. 1), 5, I 25; attributed b Ambrose, Exposiflo evangelil secundum Lucam, though it does not occur in that work.

10 Aristotle, Metaphysica, 5.15, 1021a29-35. Works. vol. 8.

But a thing has being and unity from the same cause; and therefore, because of the unity of the cause it happens that there is only one real relation.” This is obvious in the case of equality, for there is in one body only one relation of equality because of the one quantity, although this may be in regard to a number of things insofar as it is said to be equal to different bodies. If relations were really multiplied in one body according to all those references to which it is equal, it would follow that there would be an infinite or in determinate number of accidents in one thing. A teacher is by one relation a teacher of all whom he teaches the same thing although there may be many of these; so also according to one real sonship one man is the son of his father and of his mother because by one birth he received one nature from both of them. Therefore, following this reasoning, it seems that we must say that the real sonships in Christ by which he is related to the Father and to his mother are different because he is born from both by different acts of generation and the nature which he has from the Father and the nature which he has from his mother are diverse.

But another reason weakens that. For it must be universality held that no relation of God to creature really exists in God, but such is only a mental relation because God is above every order of creature and is the measure of every creature from which every creature derives, and not conversely. This is even truer of a knowable object in relation to knowledge, for in the knowable object there is no real relation to knowledge for these reasons.

We must, however, consider that the subject of sonship is not a nature or some part of a nature, for we do not say that humanity is a daughter nor that it is a head or an eye. Now in Christ we assign only one supposit and one hypostasis, just as we also assign one person which is an eternal supposit in which there can be no real relation to a creature as was just said.’ So the only remaining alternative is that the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is a mental relation only. But because of this it does not follow that he is not really the son of the Virgin, for just as God is really Lord because of the real power by which he contains a creature, so Christ really is the son of the Virgin because of the real nature which he received from his mother. If, however, there were many supposits in Christ it would be necessary to assign two sonships to Christ. But this I hold to be erroneous and it is found condemned in the Councils. So I say that in Christ there is only one real relation by which he is related to the Father.

To the first it must therefore be stated that we do not deny there is a real sonship in Christ by which he is related to his mother because the relation’s cause is lacking, but because the subject of such a relation is lacking, since there is no created supposit or hypostasis in Christ.

To the second it must be stated that the same way in which that man received the power of God temporally, he received the eternal sonship inasmuch as it was accomplished in such a way that there would be one divine and human person, as Ambrose supposes in the same place. This, however, was not accomplished through something really absolute or relative temporally inhering in the Son of God, but solely through the union which really exists in the created nature but is not, however, really in the person assuming it.

What is objected on the contrary side has no necessity, for a thing is sometimes said to be one such thing because of the subject’s substantial unity although there are many qualities in it, as there are color and taste in an apple.

Article 2: Whether Christ was dead on the cross?

Concerning the second we proceed as follows: it seems that Christ was not dead on the cross.

1. For if he was dead, this was either because he himself separated his soul from his body, or because of his wounds. But he did not die in the first way for then it would follow that the Jews would not have killed Christ but he would have killed himself, which is inappropriate. And likewise he did not die in the second way because a death due to wounds occurs when a man reaches the greatest weakness, which was not the case with Christ because he died crying out loudly. Therefore, Christ was in no way dead on the cross.

2. Moreover, human nature was no weaker in Christ than in other men, but no other man would die so quickly because of wounds of the hands and feet. The wound in the side, however, was inflicted on Christ after his death. Therefore, he was not dead on the cross since there seems to be no cause for his death.

But to the contrary: John 19:30 says that Christ hanging on the cross “with his head bowed, gave up the ghost.” Death, however, is due to the soul’s separation from the body, therefore Christ was dead on the cross.

I answer: it must be said that we must confess without any doubt that Christ was truly dead on the cross. In order to see the cause of his death we must consider that since Christ was true God and man, whatever pertains to Christ’s human nature was subject to his power, which does not happen in others who are purely men for physical things are not subject to their wills. This is the cause of Christ’s suffering and rejoicing simultaneously: by his willing, death was effected so that there would be no overflowing from the higher powers to the lower ones, nor would the higher powers be impeded in their own acts because of the suffering of the lower ones. This cannot happen in other men because of the natural conjunction of the powers with one another.

And we must answer in like manner to that which was argued, for a violent death occurs because a nature yields to harm inflicted, and so long as the nature can resist so long is death delayed. Hence things in which a nature is stronger die more slowly from the same cause. However, how much the nature would resist harm inflicted and when it would yield were subject to Christ’s will. Hence by his willing the nature resisted to the end the harm inflicted more than it could in other men so that in the end, after much effusion of blood and as though with his faculties still intact, he cried out with a loud voice, and at once by his willing the nature yielded and he gave up the ghost so that he might show himself Lord of nature and of life and death. And marveling at this, the centurion said in Mark 15:39, “Truly this man was the Son of God.”

Therefore, it is true both that the Jews killed Christ by inflicting mortal harm, and that he himself laid down his soul and gave up the ghost because when he willed it his nature yielded totally to the harm inflicted. Nor is he to be blamed as though he killed himself. For the body exists for the sake of the soul and not conversely. So injury is done to the soul when it is expelled from the body against the soul’s natural desire because of an injury inflicted on the body, although perhaps not because of the depraved will of a suicide. But if the soul had in its power the capacity to withdraw from and come into the body again when it willed, there would be no greater blame if it abandoned the body than if an inhabitant deserted a home. However, it is a matter for blame for it to be expelled from thence unwillingly.

The response to the objections is clear.

Parallel passages: ST 3, q. 47, ai; Comp. theol., e. 230; In loann., c. 2.

Two questions were asked concerning angels.

QUESTION 3: The motion of the angel

1. Whether an angel depends on a corporeal place according to its essence or is it in a corporeal place according to its action only?

2. Concerning an angel’s motion, whether it can move from one place to another without going through an intermediate place?

Article 1: Whether an angel depends on a corporeal place according to its essence, or is it in a corporeal place according to its action only?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that an angel is not in a place according to its action only.

1. For since existence is prior to action, existence in a place is prior to action in a place. But something later is not the cause of something prior. Therefore acting in a place is not the cause of an angel’s existing in a place.

2. Moreover, two angels can act in one place. Therefore, if an angel were in a place only through action, it would follow that many angels would exist simultaneously in one place, which is reputed to be impossible.

But to the contrary: something more noble does not depend on some thing less noble. But an angel’s essence is nobler than a corporeal place. Therefore, it does not depend on a corporeal place.

I answer: it must be said that we can consider the way an angel is in a corporeal place from the way in which a body is in a place, for a body is in a place through contact of the place. However, the contact of a body is through dimensional quantity which is not found in an angel since an angel is not physical but instead of it there is quantity of power. Therefore, just as a body is in a place through contact by dimensional quantity, so an angel is in a place through contact by power. If anyone wants to call contact by power an action because action is properly the effect of a power, we may say that an angel is in a place through action but in such a way that ‘action’ means not only motion but any union by which its power unites itself to a body by directing or containing it or in another way.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that nothing prohibits something from being absolutely prior which is not prior in this respect. For example, a body is a subject absolutely prior to a surface, but not as far as concerns color, and likewise a body is absolutely prior to contact. However it is in a place through contact by dimensional quantity. Similarly an angel is in a place through contact by power.

To the second it must be stated that if something is completely moved by one mover, it is not coherent that it be moved by another at the same time. So the reasoning is more valid for its opposite rather than for what is argued.

Parallel passages: ST 1, q. 52, aa.l-3;Depot.. q. 3, a.7, ad 11; a.l9 ad 1 and 2; De sep. subs., e. 18. nos. l02-l03; 1 Sent., d. 37, q.3. a. l and 3; 2 Sent., d. 6,q.l, a.3.

Article 2: Whether an angel can move from one place to another without passing through an intermediate place?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that an angel cannot move from place to place without passing through an intermediate place.

1. For everything that moves is in the process of changing before being in the state of completion of change, as Physica 6, 1 proves. But if an angel moves from one place to another, for example from A to B. When it is at B it is in the state of completion of change. Hence it was in the process of changing before. But not when it was at A because then it was not yet moving. Therefore, it will be in the process of changing when it is at c which is the intermediate between A and B. So it is necessary for it to pass through an intermediate.

2. Moreover, if an angel moves from A to B without passing through an intermediate, it will be necessary for it to be destroyed at A and created again at B. This is impossible because then it would not be the same angel. Therefore, it is necessary for it to pass through an intermediate.

But to the contrary: everything that passes through an intermediate must first pass through something equal to the thing or less before something greater, as is said in Physica 6, 10 and as it appears to the senses.’ But it cannot be less space than the angel which is in divisible, so it is necessary for it to pass through something equal to the angel which is an indivisible place like a point. An infinite number of points, however, lie between any two terms of motion. Therefore, if it were necessary for an angel in its motion to pass through an intermediate place, it would be necessary for it to pass through an infinite number, which is impossible.

I answer: it must be stated that an angel can if it wants move from one place to another without passing through an intermediate place, and if it wants it can pass through an intermediate place. The reason for this is that a body is in a place as contained by it, and therefore it is necessary that in moving it follow the condition of the place so that it passes through intermediate places prior to arriving at the boundaries of the place. But since an angel is in a place through contact by power, it is not subject to the place so as to be contained by it, but rather contains the place, being super eminent in the place by its power; so it is not necessary for it to follow the conditions of place in its motion. But it is subject to its will that it be attached to this place and that through contact by power, and without an intermediate place if it wants, just as an intellect can be attached to one extreme in understanding, e.g., to white, and afterwards to black, indifferently, either thinking or not thinking of the colors in between (although a body subject to color cannot move from white to black except through an intermediate color).

To the first it must therefore be stated that the Philosopher’s words and his proof concern continuous motion. However, an angel’s motion is not necessarily continuous, but we call the very succession of the aforesaid applications its motion, just as we call the succession of thoughts or states of mind the motion of a spiritual creature according to Augustine in Super Genesim ad litteram, 8, C 20.

To the second it must be said that this does not happen through the destruction or new creation of an angel, but because its power is super eminent over a place.

As to what is objected on the contrary side, it must be said that an angel is not in a place through having a common measure with the place but through the application of its power to the place, which application can indifferently be to a divisible and to an indivisible place. So it can move continuously as something which exists in a divisible place by continually intercepting space. But according as it is in an indivisible place its motion cannot be continuous nor pass through all intermediates.

Parallel passages: ST 1, q. 53, a.2; 1 Sent., d. 37, q.4. a.2.

Then it was asked concerning man: first as to the good in the order of nature, second as to the good in the order of grace, third as to the good in the order of glory.

QUESTION 4: Three questions were asked about the good in the order of nature:

1 concerning the union of soul and body, whether when the soul arrives at the body all the forms which inhered in the body before, both substantial and accidental ones, are destroyed?

2. concerning the power of free choice, whether a man without grace can prepare himself for grace?

3. concerning natural love, whether man in the state of innocence loved God more than all things and above himself?

Article 1: Whether when the soul arrives at the body all the forms which inhered in the body before, both substantial and accidental ones, are destroyed?

On the first we proceeded as follows: it seems that all the forms which inhered before are not removed through the arrival of the soul.

1. For Genesis 2:7 says, “God formed man from the mud of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life.” However, the body would have been formed uselessly if, in breathing in the soul, the forms which he had imparted in giving form to it were removed. Therefore, when the soul arrives, all the preceding forms are not removed.

2. Moreover, the soul necessarily exists in a body endowed with form and having many dispositions. If therefore the arriving soul removes all the preceding forms and dispositions, it foilows that in an instant the soul gives form to the whole body. But it seems God alone can do this.

3. Fùrther, the soul exists only in a heterogeneous body. But a mixture of elements invoives the forms and not only the matter of the elements, otherwise there would be destruction and not mixture. Therefore, the soul does not remove au the forms found in matter.

4. Further, the soul is a perfection. Now a perfection does not destroy, rather it perfects. Therefore, in arriving at the body it does not destroy the pre-existing forms.

But to the contrary: every form which arrives at something actually existent is accidental, for a substantial form makes actual being (esse) absolutely. But if an arriving soul did not destroy the pre-existing forms but was added on to them, it would follow that it would arrive at an actually existing thing because any form, since it is an act,

makes actual being. Therefore, the arriving soul removes the pre existing forms.

I answer: it must be stated that it is impossible for there to be many substantial forms in one and the same thing because a thing has its being and unity from the same source. It is clear, however, that a thing has being through form, hence it also has unity through form. And because of this, wherever there is a multitude of forms there is not one thing absolutely, just as a white man is not one absolutely nor would a biped animal be one absolutely if it were an animal from one component and biped from another, as the Philosopher says. But substantial forms are related to one another as numbers are, as is said in Metaphysica 8, 3, or as figures are as the Philosopher says concerning the parts of the soul in De anima 2.21 For always the greater number or figure virtually contains in itself the lesser as five contains four and as a pentagon contains a figure with four sides. And similarly the more perfect form virtually contains in itself the more imperfect as is most clear in the case of animals. For the intellective soul bas the power to confer on the human body whatever the sensitive soul confers in brute animals, and likewise the sensitive does in animals whatever the nutritive does in plants, and still more. Therefore, in man another sensitive soul in addition to the intellective soul would be useless because the intellective virtually contains the sensitive and still more, just as, given that you have something containing five members, it would be useless to add something containing four. And there is the same reasoning for all substantial forms down to prime matter so that diverse substantial forms are not found in a man except to our way of thinking, as when we consider him as living by means of a nutritive soul and as sensing by means of a sensitive soul. and so on concerning the others.

Clearly, however, when a perfect form arrives an imperfect form is always removed. For example, when the figure of a pentagon arrives that of a rectangle is removed. So I say that when the human soul arrives, the substantial form which inhered before is removed. Otherwise there would be generation of the one without the destruction of the other which is impossible. The accidental forms which inhered before and prepared for the soul are not indeed destroyed essentially but accidentally when the subject is destroyed. So they remain specifically but not numerically the same, as also happens concerning the dispositions of the forms of the elements which seem to reach matter first.

To the first it must be stated therefore that according to Basil, the grace of the Holy Spirit is there called the breath of life, and S0 the objection ceases. However, if as Augustine says the breath of life is the soul itself, it will not be necessary to say that the human body is given form from the mud of the earth with a form other than the very breath of life divinely breathed in. For that imparting of form did not precede in time the breathing-in, unless perhaps we should want to say that the imparting of form is referred to the accidental dispositions, e.g., shape and the like, which by a certain order of reason are understood to be in the body as material dispositions before the intellective soul arrives. But the intellective soul is itself presupposed by these dispositions, not as intellective but as containing in itself virtually something of the more imperfect forms.

To the second it must be said that the soul, when it arrives at the body, is not the efficient but only the formal cause of the body’s being. However, that which is the efficient cause of the body’s form makes the body to be as perfecting it; that which works beforehand on the form by gradually and in a certain order bringing matter to a closer form or disposition makes the body to be by preparing it. The nearer a form or disposition is, the less the resistance to the introduction of the form and complete disposition. For fire is more easily made from air than from water, although each form is immediately present in matter.

To the third it must be said that Avicenna maintained the forms of the elements remain in a mixture in act. This cannot be because the forms of the elements cannot exist in one and the same part of matter at the same time, and sø it is necessary that they exist in diverse parts of matter which are distinguished according to the division of dimensional quantity. Then it will be necessary that either many bodies exist at the same time or that it is not a true mixture of every part to every part but a mixture appearing to the senses only, because of the juxtaposition of the smallest particles. Averroes, however, in De caelo 3, n° 67. says that the forms of the elements are intermediate between accidental and substantial forms, and that they receive degrees of more and less. And so, when the forms of the elements are modified and reduced to equilibrium, somehow a mixture is made. But this is less possible than the first opinion. For a substantial form is a kind of limit to specific existence whence in an indivisible the notion of form is like the notion of number and shape, nor is it possible that it be more intense or less, but every addition or subtraction makes an other species. And therefore we must say otherwise, following the Philosopher in De generatione 1, 10 that the forms of the components do not remain in the mixture actually, but they remain virtually according as the power of the substantial form remains in the elementary quality although modified and reduced as it were to equilibrium. For an elementary quality acts in virtue of a substantial form. Otherwise the action which is through the heat of fire would not be terminated in a substantial form.

To the fourth it must be stated that the soul, since it is a form, is indeed a kind of particular perfection, however not a universal one. And therefore when it arrives something is perfected but in such a way that something else is destroyed.

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 1l, q. 5; ST 1, q. 76, a.4; 4 Sent., d. 44, q.l, al, qc 1, ad 4; cc 4, c. 8l; Spir. creal., a.3; Quaest. de anima, q. 9; Comp. theoL, c. 90.

Article 2: Whether a man without grace can prepare himself for grace?

On the second we proceeded as follows: it seems that a man without grace can prepare himself for grace through the natural liberty of choice.

1. Because as Proverbs 16:1 says, “To prepare the mind pertains to man.” However, that is said to pertain to someone which is assigned to his power. Therefore, to be able to prepare himself for grace was assigned to the power of man. He does not then need the aid of grace.

2. Moreover, Anselm says in De casu diaboli, 3 that someone does not lack grace because God does not want to give it but because he does not want to receive it. Therefore, if he wanted to receive it he could, so he can if he wants prepare himself for grace without external aid.

3. But the objector said that a man needs the aid of grace in this matter as an external mover. On the contrary: we can say that a man can be moved to conversion not only from good things but even from sins, for example if someone should see someone sinning heinously and from the horror of the sin be turned to God. But the sin is not from God. Therefore, without God’s action a man can prepare himself for grace.

But to the contrary: we are prepared for grace through being turned to God. But for this we need the aid of divine grace for Lamentations 5:21 says, “Convert us, Lord, to you, and we shah be converted.” Therefore, to prepare himself for grace a man needs the aid of divine grace.

Moreover, a man cannot prepare himself for anything except by thinking. But for this itself a man needs the aid of grace, for it is said in 2 Cor. 3:5, “We are insufficient of ourselves to think anything as from ourselves.” Therefore, we need the aid of divine grace to prepare ourselves for grace.

I answer: it must be said that in this question we must guard against the error of Pelagius who maintained that through free choice a man could fulfill the law and merit eternal life nor needed divine aid except in order to know what to do, according to Psalm 143 (142)10, “Teach me to do your will.” 29 But because this seemed much too little (for then we would have knowledge only from God but the charity by which the precepts of the law are fulfilled we would have from ourselves), the Pelagians afterwards maintained that a man has the beginning of a good work from himself when he consents to faith through free choice, but a man has the consummation of the work from God. But preparation pertains to the beginning of a good work. So saying that a man may be able to prepare himself for grace without the aid of divine grace pertains to the Pelagians’ error and is against the Apostle who says in Phil. 1:6, “He who has begun a good work in you will perfect it.”

Therefore, a man needs the aid of grace not only to merit but even to prepare himself for grace, but in different ways. For a man merits through an act of virtue when he not only does good but does well, for which a habit is required as is said in Ethica 2, 6. And therefore, grace in the mode of a habit is required for meriting. But for a man to prepare himself to acquire a habit he does not need another habit because then the process would go on to infinity. However, he needs divine aid not only with regard to exterior movers insofar as divine providence procures for a man occasions for salvation, e.g., teaching. examples, and occasionally sicknesses and tribulations, but even with regard to interior motion insofar as God moves the interior heart of a man to the good, according to Proverbs 21:1, “The heart of the king is in the hand of God; he will turn that wherever he wants.” That this is necessary the Philosopher proves in a chapter of De bono fortunae (Etique Eudemia, 2, 9), for a man does this by his will; however, the principle of the will is choice and of choice, counsel. But if it were asked what kind of counsel he should begin to take, it cannot be said that he should begin to take counsel from a counsel because thus the process would be infinite. So it is necessary for there to be some exterior principle which moves the human mind to taking counsel concerning things to be done, and this must be something better than the human mind. Hence it is not a celestial body which is lower than an intellectual power, but God, as the Philosopher concludes in the same place. Therefore, just as the principle of every motion of lower bodies which are not always moved is the motion of the heavens, so the principle of all interior motions of minds is God as mover. No one then can prepare himself for grace nor do anything good except through divine aid.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that the necessity of divine aid is not excluded because it pertains to a man to prepare himself for grace through free choice, just as neither is the necessity of heavenly motion excluded because it pertains to fire to heat.

To the second it must be stated that God moves everything according to its manner. So divine motion is imparted to some things with necessity; however, it is imparted to the rational nature with liberty because the rational power is related to opposites. God so moves the human mind to the good, however, that a man can resist this motion. And so, that a man should prepare himself for grace is from God, but that he should lack grace does not have its cause from God but from the man, according to Hosea 13:9, “Your ruin is from you self, Israel; your help is only from me.”

To the third it must be stated that although sin is not from God, God sometimes arranges sin to be the occasion of someone’s salvation.

Article 3: Whether man in the state of innocence loved God above all things?

On the third we proceed as follows: it seems that the first man in the state of innocence did not love God above all things and more than himself.

1. For so to love God is most meritorious. But the first man in that state did not have that whereby he might be able to advance by means of merit, as is said in Sententiarum 2, 2 d. 24, d. Therefore, the first man in that state did not love God more than himself and above ah things.

2. Further, so to love God is the human mind’s greatest preparation for attaining grace. However, the first man in that state is held not to have had grace but only natural endowments. Therefore, he did not love God more than himself and above ah things.

3. Moreover, nature curves back upon itself, since it channels back to itself all things that it loves. But the adequate cause of each thing is of like kind only more so. Therefore, by natural love he loved himself more than God so he did not love God above ah things.

But to the contrary: if he did not love God more than himself, either he loved him less than himself or equally with himself. In each way it follows that man took pleasure in himself while he did not refer himself to God. However, taking pleasure in oneself brings the perversity of sin, as Augustine says. Therefore, the first man in the state of innocence was already perverted through sin, which is impossible. So it follows that he loved God above all things.

I answer: it must be said that if man was made in grace, as can be seen from the words of Basil and Augustine De civitale Dei 14, cc. 12, the question is point less. For it is clear that someone who is in a state of grace loves God through charity above himself. But because it was possible for God to make man with purely natural endowments, it is useful to consider how much natural love could be extended.

Some said that a man or an angel existing in a purely natural state loves God more than himself by a natural love according to the love of desire, because he desires more the enjoyment of the divine good as something higher and sweeter. But a man naturally loves himself more than God according to the love of friendship. It is by the love of desire that we are said to love that which we want to use or enjoy, such as wine or some such thing; however, the love of friendship is that by which we are said to love a friend to whom we wish good.

This position cannot stand, for natural love is a kind of natural inclination engrafted in a nature by God. But nothing natural is perverse, therefore it is impossible for any natural inclination or love to be perverse. Since it is a perverse love for someone to love himself more than God by the love of friendship, such a love cannot be natural. So we must say that to love God above all things and more than oneself is natural not only for an angel and a man but also for any creature according as it can love sensitively and naturally for natural inclinations can especially be known in these things which are done naturally without the deliberation of reason, for in this way everything in nature is born to act as is fitting. But we see that any part, by a kind of natural inclination, works for the good of the whole, even to its own danger or detriment, for example when some one exposes his hand to a sword to defend his head on which his whole body’s health depends. So it is natural that any part in its way loves the whole more than itself. And also according to this natural inclination and according to political virtue, the good citizen faces the danger of death for the common good. But it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts, so any creature in its way naturally loves God more than itself — insensible things do so naturally, brute animals sensitively, rational creatures through the intellectual love which is called love (dilectio).

To the first it must therefore be said that to love God as the principle of all being pertains to natural love, but to love God as the object of beatitude pertains to the gratuitous love in which merit consists. However, it is not necessary that we sustain in this matter the opinion of the Master who said that man in the first state did not have the grace through which he could merit.

To the second it must be said that someone can make more or less use of the natural love by which God is naturally loved above all things, and when he uses it in the highest way there is the supreme preparation for having grace.

38 In general St. Thomas distinguishes three types of love. .4mor is love which pertains to the appetites — natural, sensitive, or intellectual. Dilectio adds to the notion of amor the notion of a preceding choice so that this type of love cannot be found in the concupiscible appetite but must belong to the will of a rational being. Caritas adds to these notions that of a kind of perfection of love, the object of love being esteemed as something of great value. Sec ST l-2, q. 26. a.3, Blackfriars ed., 19: 68-71.

To the third it must be said that the natural inclination of a thing is to two things: to motion and to action. Now that natural inclination to motion curves back on itself just as fire moves upwards for the sake of its conservation, but that natural inclination to action does not curve back on itself, for fire does not act to generate fire for its own sake but for the good of what is generated which is its form, and further for the common good which is the conservation of the species. Hence it is clear that it is not universally true that every natural love curves back on itself.

Parallel passages: ST 1, q. 60, a.5; l-2, q. 109, a.3; 2-2, q. 26, a.3; 2 Sent., d. 3, p.2, q.3 3, d. 29, a.3; De div. nom., c. 4, lects. 9, 10.

Then the question was asked concerning matters which pertain to the good in the order of grace: first, concerning these matters which pertain to the good in the order of grace itself; second, concerning these matters which pertain to the evil of sin which is opposed to it. Concerning those matters which pertain to everyone, the question was asked about two parts of penance:

1. concerning contrition, whether namely a contrite person ought to prefer being in heu to sinning?

2. concerning confession.

QUESTION 5: Concerning contrition.

Article: Whether a contrite person ought to prefer being in hell to sinning?

On the first we proceeded as follows: it seems that a contrite person ought not to prefer being in hell to sinning.

1. For the punishment of hell is eternal and irremediable, but he can be freed from sin through repentance. Therefore, he ought to prefer sinning to being in hell.

2. Further, the punishment of hell includes guilt, for one of the punishments of hell is the worm, i.e., remorse of conscience concerning a sin, but guilt does not include the punishment of hell. Therefore, sin is to be preferred to the punishment of hell.

But to the contrary: Anselm says in De similitudinibus, PL 159: 701 that someone ought to prefer being in hell without sin to being in paradise with sin, because an innocent person in hell would not feel the punishment and a sinner in paradise would not enjoy the glory.

I answer: it must be said that in general, a contrite person is bound to prefer suffering any punishment to sinning because there can be no contrition without the charity through which all sins are renounced. From charity a man loves God more than himself, but sinning is acting against God. Now to be punished is to suffer something against oneself. So charity requires that a contrite person prefer any punishment to guilt.

But in a particular case he is not bound to descend to a consideration of this or that punishment. Rather someone would act foolishly if he were to worry himself or another over such particular punish merits, for it is clear that just as desirable things move one more when considered in particular than when considered in general, so do terrible things frighten more if considered in particular. And there are some people who do not fall to a lesser temptation who would perhaps fall to a greater one, e.g., somone who just hears of adultery is not incited to iust but if in thought he descended to considering particuiar allurements he would be moved more. Likewise someone might not run away from undergoing death for Christ, but if he were to descend to considering individual punishments he would be more restrained from doing it. And therefore, to descend to a consideration of such particulars is to lead a man to temptation and to supply an occasion for sinning.

Therefore, it must be said to the first that deadly guilt is also 0f itself perpetual, but it can be cured by God’s mercy alone. Moreover, the divine good against which guilt acts more outweighs the good of a created nature to which the punishment is opposed than the perpetuity of the punishment outweighs the temporality of guilt.

To the second it must be said that remorse of conscience is not guilt but the consequent of guilt and could arise without guilt as in the case of one who has an erring conscience from a past act of commission, e.g., if someone believes some act he committed before was unlawful when, however, it was permissible and he himself reckoned it permissible while he committed it.

Parallel passages: 4 Sent., d. i7, q.2, a.3, sol. i, ad 4; Suppl., q. 3, al, ad 4; ln Ps., 37.

QUESTION 6: Then three questions were asked about confession:

1. Whether it is sufficient for someone to confess in writing, or is it necessary for him to confess by spoken word?

2. Whether someone is bound to confess immediately when there is opportunity or can he wait till Lent?

3. Whether a parish priest ought to believe his subject when he says he confessed to another priest and give him the Eucharist?

Article 1: Whether it is sufficient for someone to confess in writing or is it necessary for him to confess by spoken word?

On the first we proceeded as follows: it seems that it is sufficient for someone to confess in writing, for confession is required for the manifestation of a sin, but a sin can be manifested in writing as well as by spoken word. Therefore, it suffices if he confesses in writing.

But to the contrary: in Romans 10:10 it is said, “Confession is made orally for salvation.”

I answer: it must be said that confession is part of a sacrament. So just as in baptism something is required on the minister’s part, namely that he cleanse and speak the words, and something on the part of the one submitting to the sacrament, namely that he intend to and be cleansed, so in the sacrament of penance it is required on the priest’s part that he absolve under some form of words, on the penitent’s part it is required that he subject himself to the keys of the Church, manifesting his sins through confession. Therefore, it is essential to the sacrament that he manifest his sins, and no one may dispense from this as neither may anyone dispense from baptism. But it is not essential to the sacrament that the manifestation be made by spoken word, otherwise no one could receive the effect of this sacrament in any case of necessity except by confessing orally, which is clearly false for it is sufficient for mutes or anyone who cannot confess orally to confess by writing or gestures. However, in no case of necessity can anyone be baptized except by water because water is essential to the sacrament.

But from the Church’s decree a man who can is bound to confess by spoken word, not only because the one confessing orally blushes more in confessing so that he who sins orally is cleansed orally, but also because in all the sacraments that whose use is more common is always accepted. So in the sacramental cleansing of baptism, water, which men more commonly use to wash with, is accepted, and in the Eucharist bread, which is a rather common food, and so also in the manifestation of sins it is fitting to use spoken words by which men are more commonly and with more clarity accustomed to signify their concepts.

And in this sacrament a character is not imprinted, but grace for the remission of sin alone is conferred, which no one obtains by sinning. However, he who ignores the Church’s decrees sins; so in baptism he who preserves what is essential to the sacrament while overlooking the laws of the Church obtains the character of the sacrament but here, however, nothing follows.

However, the reasons which are introduced for both sides are not very compelling. For manifestation of sins cannot be so expressly done in writing as in spoken words, nor is what is said in “Confession is made orally for salvation” meant with regard to the confession of sins but rather with regard to the confession of faith.

Parallel passage: Suppl., q. 9, a.3.

Article 2: Whether someone is bound to confess immediately when there is opportunity or can he wait till Lent?

Concerning the second we proceed as follows: it seems that someone can delay confession until Lent.

1. For whoever keeps the teaching of the Church is not delinquent. But the Church established that men should confess their own sins once a year. Therefore, if someone waits till the term established by the Church he does not sin.

2. Moreover, baptism is a sacrament of necessity as penance is also. But a catechumen does not sin if he delays baptism until Holy

Saturday. Therefore, for the same reason neither does a contrite person sin if he delays confession until Lent.

3. Further, contrition is more necessary than confession. But confession without contrition is not strong enough for salvation, though contrition without confession can be strong enough in some cases. Now he who is in sin S not bound to be penitent immediately by the contrition which abolishes sin, otherwise the sinner would sin in every single moment. Therefore, neither is the contrite person bound to confess immediately with the result that if he does otherwise he sins.

But to the contrary: a spiritual disease is more to be relieved than a physical disease. But someone subject to a physical disease would endanger himself unless he sought the remedy of medicine as quickly as he could, and he would sin from negligence. Therefore, all the more does he sin who delays to apply the remedy of confession against the spiritual disease of Sin.

I answer: it must be said that it is laudable for the sinner to confess his sin as quickly as he conveniently can because a grace is conferred through the sacrament of penance which makes a man stronger in resisting sin. However, some said that he is bound to confess as quickly as the opportunity of confessing offered itself so that if he delays he sins. This is against the intelligible structure of an affirmative precept which, although it obliges always, does not however oblige for always but obliges for a fixed place and time. Now the time for fulfilling the precept concerning confession is when an occasion is imminent in which it is necessary for a man to confess, e.g., if the moment of death is imminent, or the necessity of receiving the Eucharist or Holy Orders or the like, for which it is necessary for a man to be prepared by being cleansed through confession. So if one of these events is imminent and someone neglects confession, he sins as long as a due opportunity is present. And because from the Church’s precept all believers are bound to take the communion of the sacrament at least once a year, on the feast of Easter especially, therefore the Church decreed that once a year when the time for taking the Eucharist is near all believers should confess. Therefore, I say that delaying confession until this time, essentially speaking, is permitted but it can become unlawful accidentally, e.g., if a moment in which confession is required should be near, or if someone delays confession out of contempt. And likewise such a delay may be accidentally meritorious if he delays so that he may confess more prudently or more devoutly because of the holy season.

Therefore, we concede the first reasons.

To that which is objected on the contrary side it must be said that a physical disease, unless it is extinguished through the remedy of medicine, always grows worse if it is not perhaps also extinguished by natural power. However, the disease of sin is extinguished through contrition; so it is not a similar case.

Parallel passage: Suppl.. q. 6, a. 5.

Article 3: Whether a parish priest ought to believe his subject when he says he confessed to another and give him the Eucharist?

On the third we proceed as follows: it seems that a parish priest ought not to believe his subject when he says he confessed to another and give him the Eucharist because of this.

1. For frequently some persons are made contrite by confession alone who were not contrite before. But a priest ought to lead his subject to good insofar as he is able. Therefore it seems he ought absolutely to ask his subject to confess to him.

2. Moreover, Proverbs 27:33 tells the pastor of a church, “Be diligent in knowing the appearance of your flock.” But this cannot be done better than through confession. Therefore, he ought to demand from the subject that he confess to him.

But to the contrary: if he confesses to him, the subject could say what he wanted and the priest would believe him. Therefore, the priest ought also believe that he confessed.

I answer: it must be said that in the judicial tribunal a man is believed when he speaks against but not for himself. However, in the tribunal of penance a man is believed when he speaks for and against himself. Therefore, a distinction must be made because there may be an impediment hindering someone from taking the Eucharist in two ways. For if there is an impediment pertaining to the judicial tribunal, e.g., excommunication, the priest is not bound to believe his subject whom he knew to be excommunicate unless his absolution is evident to him. If, however, there is an impediment which pertains to the tribunal of penance, namely sin, he is bound to believe him and acts unjustly if he denies the Eucharist to one who says he confessed and was absolved by one who could absolve by apostolic authority or the authority of the bishop.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that that good which men attain in confession the person who says he confessed has already obtained if he speaks truly; if however he speaks falsely, in like manner he could speak falsely in confessing. Nor can anyone be compelled by any man’s authority to confess a sin which was confessed to another who could absolve it because, as was already said, the confession of sins is part of a sacrament subject to divine and not human command.

To the second it must be said that a spiritual pastor ought diligently to recognize the appearance of his flock by considering its exterior life. But he cannot investigate more diligently than by way of confession, hence it is necessary for him to believe those things which are said to him by his subject.

Parallel passages: 4 Sent., d. 17, q.3, a.3, sol. 5, ad 4; Suppl., q. 8, aS; CG 4, c. 72.

***

QUESTION 7: Then two questions were asked concerning these matters which pertain to clerics:

1. concerning the office of the Church, whether one who has prebends in two churches ought to recite both offices on the day on which diverse offices are performed in each church?

2. concerning the study of theology, whether someone is bound to give up the study of theology, even if he is suited to teaching others, in order to devote himself to the salvation of souls?

Article 1: Whether one who has prebends in two churches ought to recite both offices on the day on which diverse offices are performed in each church?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that someone in such a case ought to recite both offices.

1. For a burden ought to correspond to an emolument. Therefore, one who has the emolument of a prebend in two churches ought to bear the burden of each by reciting the office of each church.

2. Further, it seems just that if he has a greater emolument from one church in which perhaps a more extensive office is chanted, that he also take on a greater burden by reciting the more extensive office. Therefore, the choice is not his but either he ought to recite both or he ought to recite the office of the church in which he has the more lucrative benefice.

Custom was adduced to the contrary.

I answer: it must be said that, on the supposition that someone is lawfully prebended in two churches, namely because of a dispensation, we must consider that someone who received a prebend in any church is obligated to two things, namely to God to pay the praises due for his benefices, and to the church from which he receives an income. Those things which pertain to a church are subject to the dispensation of the church prelates. And therefore, the debt which he owes the church he ought to pay according to what was stipulated, either through himself if it is a prebend which requires residence, or through a vicar if this suffices according to the statute and custom of the church. The debt which he owes God he ought to pay through himself, but it does not matter to God by which psalms and hymns he praises him, for example, whether he says in Vespers “Dixit Dominus,” or “Laudate, puerl, Dominum,” except that a person ought to follow the traditions of his forebears. And because the praises he owes God he owes as one man, it suffices that he recite the office once according to the custom of one of the churches of which he is a cleric. Concerning the choice of office it seems reasonable that he should recite the office of that church in which he has the higher rank, e.g., if he is a dean in one and a simple canon in the other he ought to recite the office of the church in which he is a dean. If he is a simple canon in each church, he ought to recite the office of the church of higher dignity, although perhaps he has the more opulent prebend in the lesser church, because temporal matters are of no moment compared to spiritual matters. If indeed both churches are of equal dignity, he can choose whichever office he prefers if he is absent from both churches. However, if he is present in one of them he ought to conform himself to those with whom he is living.

And so the answer to the objections is clear.

Related passages concerning the obligation of office: Quodlibet 3, q. 13. a.2; 6, q. 5, a.2.

Article 2: Whether someone is bound to give up the study of theology, even if he is suited to teaching others, in order to devote himself to the salvation of souls?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that someone who can devote attention to the salvation of souls sins if he occupies his time in study.

1. For it is said in Galatians 6:10, “Let us do good while we have time.” Also, no loss is more serious than that of time. Therefore, no one ought to spend his whole time in study, delaying to devote attention to the salvation of souls.

2. Moreover. the perfect are bound to do that which is better. But the religious are perfect so they ought speciality to give up study to devote themselves to the salvation of souls.

3. Further, it is worse to wander off the moral path than a foot path. But a prelate is bound to call his subject back if he sees him wander off the footpath, therefore all the more is he bound to call him back from wandering off the moral path. But it is an error for a man to neglect what is better. Therefore a prelate ought to force a subject to apply his mind to the salvation of souls and neglect study.

On the contrary side, custom was brought in instead of reasoning.

I answer: it must be said that any two things can be compared with each other both absolutely and according to some particular case. For nothing prohibits that which is absolutely better from being the less preferred in some- case, e.g., philosophizing is absolutely better than increasing your wealth but in time of necessity the latter is to be preferred. And any precious pearl is dearer than one piece of bread, but in a case of hunger the bread is to be preferred to the pearl according to Lamentations 1:11, “They gave all valuable things for food in order to revive their souls.”

However, we must consider that in any art the one who arranges the art and is called the architect is absolutely better than any manual laborer who carries out what is arranged for him by another. So also in constructing buildings, the one who arranges the building although he does no work with his hands is contracted for greater pay than the manual workers who hew the wood and cut the stones. But in a spiritual building there are the manual workers, as it were, who particularly pursue the direction of souls, e.g., by administering the sacraments or by doing some such thing in particular. But the bishops are like the principal artificers who command and arrange in what way the aforesaid workers ought to follow their office, because of which they are called “episcopi,’ i.e., superintendents. And likewise teachers of theology are like principal artificers who inquire and teach how others ought to procure the salvation of souls.

Therefore, it is absolutely better to teach theology and more meritorious if it is done with good intention, than to devote particular care to the salvation of this one and that. Whence the Apostle says concerning himself in 1 Cor. 1:17, “For Christ did not send me to baptize but to teach the Gospel,” although baptizing is especially a work bearing on the salvation of souls. And in 2 Timothy 2:2. the same Apostle says, “Commit to faithful men who shall be qualified also to teach others.” Reason itself also demonstrates that it is better to teach those matters pertaining to salvation to them who can be of profit both to themselves and to others than the simple people who can be of use to themselves only. However, in a particular case where necessity requires, both bishops and teachers, having interrupted their own duties. ought to devote themselves particularly to the salvation of souls.

Therefore, to the first if must be said that someone who does what is better suffers no loss of time by teaching theology. nor does someone who disposes himself to this through study.

To the second it must be said that a person is called perfect because he has perfection or because he has a state of perfection. Now human perfection consists in the charity which joins a man to God, hence Genesis 17:1 says concerning love of God, “Walk before me and be perfect.” Indeed the Lord says afterwards concerning love of neighbor, “Love your enemies,” and in Matthew 5:48 he concludes, “Be therefore perfect.” They are said to have a state of perfection, however, who are solemnly obligated to something connected with perfection.

Now something is connected with the perfection of charity in two ways. Something is connected in one way as a preamble and some thing preparatory to perfection. like poverty, chastity and such by which a man is drawn back from the care of wordily things so that he has more free time for these things which are God’s. Whence such men are more completely instruments of perfection. Because of this Jerome, expounding the words of Peter who said in Matthew 19:27. “Behold we gave up all and followed you,” says that it is not sufficient for Peter to say “Behold we gave up all,” but he added what was perfect, “and followed you.” Therefore, those who preserve either voluntary poverty or chastity have indeed something preparatory to perfection but they are not said to have a state of perfection unless they obligate themselves to such a position by a solemn profession. Something solemn and perpetual is said to have a state, as is clear in the states of liberty, matrimony, and the like.

Something is connected to the perfection of charity in the other way as an effect, as when someone undertakes the direction of souls, for it pertains to perfect charity that someone out of love of God neglect the delight of the contemplative life which he loves more than the active and accept the occupations of the active life to procure the salvation of his neighbors. Therefore, he who applies himself in this way for the salvation of his neighbors has indeed an effect of perfection but not the state of perfection, except a bishop who, with a kind of solemn consecration, undertakes the direction of souls. Arch deacons and parish priests rather have certain duties committed to them than that they have been placed through them in a state of perfection. Therefore, only religious and bishops are said to be perfect as having the state of perfection, hence religious are made bishops but they are not made archdeacons or parish priests.

So when it is said that perfect persons are obliged to do what is better, it is true if it be understood of those who are called perfect because of the perfection of charity, for such are obligated from an inner law which binds by inclining so that they are obligated to fulfilling it according to the measure of their perfection. However, if it be understood of those who are called perfect because of a state, such as bishops and religious, it is not true for bishops are only bound to those things to which the charge of the governance undertaken extends, and religious are only bound to that to which they are obligated from the vow of their profession. Otherwise obligation would go on to infinity. but nature, art, and every law must have certain boundaries. Even given that the perfect are always bound to do that which is better, it would not be to the purpose as appears from what was said above.

To the third it must be said that although a prelate may be bound to call his subject back from all evil, he is not bound to lead him to everything better. This reasoning too has no place in the argument as neither do the others, etc.

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 3, q. 6, a.3, ad 5; ST 2-2, q. 182, a.2; 3 Sent., d. 30, q.l, a.4, ad 2; d. 35, q.l, a.4, qc 2.

***

QUESTION 8: Then two questions were asked concerning those matters which pertain to religious:

1. Whether a religious is bound to obey his prelate so as to reveal to him a secret which was committed to his trust?

2. Whether he is bound to obey him so as to reveal a hidden fault of a brother which he knows?

Article 1: Whether a religious is bound to obey his prelate so as to reveal to him a secret which was committed to his trust?

Concerning the first we proceed as follows: it seems that a religious is bound to reveal to a prelate commanding it any secret committed to his trust. For by a solemn profession a religious bound himself to obey the prelate but he bound himself by a simple promise to keep the secret. Therefore, he ought to obey the prelate rather than keep the secret.

But to the contrary: Bernard says that what was instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against charity. But the profession of obedience which a religious makes to a prelate was instituted for the sake of charity, therefore it does not militate against the charity by which anyone is bound to keep a neighbour's trust.

I answer: it must be said that, as Bernard says in De dispensatione et praecepto, it is sufficient obedience for a religious to obey his prelate concerning those matters which pertain to the rule either directly, such as those that are written in the rule, or indirectly, such as those which can be reduced to the former as are services produced for brothers and punishments inflicted for faults and the like. Now it is perfect obedience for him to obey simply in all matters which are not against the rule or against God, but it is a rash and impermissible obedience for someone to obey the prelate in these matters which are against God or against the rule.

We must therefore consider in the case under question whether it is permissible for a religious to reveal a secret committed to his trust. A distinction must be made with regard to secrets. There is a kind of secret which it is not permissible to conceal, e.g., one that tends to the danger of others from whom one is bound to avert the danger, whence it is even contained in the oath of fidelity that servants should reveal such secrets to their masters. Therefore, a religious is bound to make such a secret known on the prelate’s command even if he promised not to reveal it (unless perhaps he heard it in confession because then it must in no way be revealed). As Isidore says, “Iii cases of bad promises, break the faith.” 46 There is, however, another kind of secret which of itself can be concealed without sin, and such a secret a religious ought in no way to announce to the prelate commanding it if it is committed to his trust, for he would sin in breaking the trust committed to him.

To the first it must therefore be said that the obligation, which cornes from natural law and the promise made in baptism, to keep those matters which pertain to faith and charity, is a more solemn obligation than those which come from taking religious vows.

Parallel passages: ST 2-2, q. 68, al, ad 3; q. 70, al, ad 2.

Article 2: Whether a religious is bound to obey his prelate so as to reveal a fault of a brother which he knows?

Concerning the second we proceed as follows: it seems that a subject ought to reveal the hidden fault of another brother to the prelate commanding it. Because, as Jerome says, the fault of one ought not to be hidden to the damage of the many. But it must be presumed that the prelate wants to know the fault of one for the sake of the good of the many, therefore the fault of another should be revealed to a prelate commanding it.

But to the contrary: Gregory says that even if we ought sometimes to abandon some goods for the sake of obedience, we ought in no way to perpetrate something bad for the sake of obedience. But dishonouring another by revealing a hidden sin seems to be bad, therefore this should not be done for the sake of obedience.

I answer: it must be said that a religious prelate presides over a chapter as an ecclesiastical judge over a judicial tribunal, whence he can obligate his subjects to make disclosure to him on command with regard to matters on which an ecclesiastical judge in a judicial tribunal can require an oath. Therefore, we must know that the way of proceeding in criminal cases is triple, one through denunciation. another through inquisition, another through accusation.

In the method of denunciation the correction of a delinquent is intended and therefore brotherly correction ought to precede this, according to the Lord in Matthew 18, so that you accuse him between yourself and him alone, but if he does not listen you should accuse him in the presence of two or three others. and lastly the matter may be related to the Church. For it pertains to charity that someone spare a brother as much as he can. Hence he ought first to strive to correct the brother’s conscience, preserving his reputation by admonishing him in solitary fashion and afterwards in the presence of two or three. Finally public repute must be disregarded in order that conscience be corrected and the affair must be related to the Church, in which process consideration is taken for conscience. For a sinner, if from the beginning he saw his sin made public would lose shame and be made to sin more obstinately.

Indeed ill report ought to come first in inquisition and in accusation a written statement through which the accuser obligates himself to recompense ought to come first. However, in inquisition and accusation the punishment of the sinner is intended for the good of the many. Therefore, if the accuser who obligates himself to recompense should appear in the chapter, the prelate can by a command demand a confession of truth as also an ecclesiastical judge can demand an oath. And likewise, if ill report comes first, the prelate can by a command ascertain the truth and the subjects are bound to obey. If, however, the process is one of simple denunciation, the religious is not bound by the prelate giving the command to reveal a brother’s fault unless he sees him uncorrected by a preceding warning. Rather he would sin more if he revealed it on the prelate’s command because he is bound more strongly to obey the Gospel than the prelate. And the prelate would sin much more if he were to lead his subject to pervert the order of the Gospel.

To the first it must be stated that with respect to a past sin on which one has been corrected already by a secret admonition or on which it can be hoped that one will be corrected, unless the contrary is found to be the case. there can be no threat of danger to the multitude. Still. the objection goes forward concerning a future sin which is dangerous to the multitude, either spiritually or corporeally, for then it is not necessary to wait for a secret admonition, but rather it is necessary to oppose the danger immediately. Whence also the Lord does not say, “if he intends to sin in the future,” but “if he has sinned in the past” (Matthew 18:15).

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 4. q. 8, aI; ST 2-2, q. 70, aI; 4Sent., d. 19, q.2, a.3, qc I, ad5.

QUESTION 9: Then four questions pertaining to sin were asked:

1. Whether sin is some sort of nature?

2. Whether perjury is a more serious sin than homicide?

3. Whether a person sins who out of ignorance does not observe a papal constitution?

4. Whether a monk sins mortally in eating meat?

Article 1: Whether sin is some sort of nature?

On the first we proceeded as follows: it seems that sin is not some sort of nature. For John 1:3 says, “Without him nothing was made,” i.e., sin. But what is a nature cannot be called nothing, therefore sin is not some sort of nature.

But to the contrary: if sin is not some sort of nature it is necessarily a pure privation. But pure privations like death and darkness do not admit of degrees of more and less. Therefore, one sin would not be more serious than another, which is incoherent.

I answer: it must be said that a sin, especially of transgression, is a disorderly act. On the part of the act, therefore, sin is some sort of nature. But lack of order is a privation and according to this sin is called nothing. And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Parallel passages: 2 Sent., d. 37, q.l, ai; De malo, q. 2, a.l, ad 4.

Article 2: Whether perjury is a more serious sin than homicide?

Concerning the second we proceeded as follows: it seems that perjury is a more serious sin than homicide.

1. For Bernard says that neither God nor man can dispense from the precepts of the first table, however God but not man can dispense from the precepts of the second table. From this we can understand that it is more serious to sin against the precepts of the first table than against the precepts of the second. But perjury is against the precept of the first table which is “Do not take the name of your God in vain;” homicide, however, is against the precept of the second table, “Do not kill.” Therefore, perjury is a more serious sin than homicide.

2. Moreover, it is more serious to sin against God than against man. But perjury is a sin against God, homicide a sin against man; therefore perjury is a more serious sin than homicide.

But to the contrary: punishment is proportioned to the fault but homicide is punished more severely than perjury so it is the more serious sin.

I answer: it must be said that, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 6:16, “Men swear by what is greater than themselves and an oath puts an end to all their wrangling.” However, in the case of homicide an oath would be the end of wrangling uselessly if homicide were a more serious fault than perjury, for it would be presumed that someone who committed the greater fault of homicide would not fear to incur the lesser one of perjury. So because an oath is deposed in the case of any sin, it is clearly shown that perjury ought to be held the greatest sin, nor undeservedly because to perjure the name of God seems to be a kind of denial of the divine name, so the sin of perjury holds second place after idolatry, as appears from the order of the precepts. But also with the Gentiles an oath was most honored, as is said in Metaphysica l, 3.

We grant the first reasons.

To what is objected on the contrary side: it must be stated that in human judgment the quantity of punishment does not always correspond to the quantity of the fault for sometimes a greater punishment is inflicted for a lesser fault, when more serious harm threatens men from the lesser fault. But according to God’s judgment, the more serious fault is punished by the more severe punishment. Whence so that the gravity of idolatry and perjury might be shown, after he said in the first precept, “You will not adore nor worship those,” it is added in Exodus 20:5, “I am the Lord your God visiting the iniquities of the fathers on the sons.” And after he said (verse 7), “Do not take the name of the Lord your God in vain,” he adds, “for the Lord will not hold him who takes his name in vain guiltless.”

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 5, q. 10, a.2; ST 2-2, q. 70, a.4, ad 3.

Article 3: Whether a person sins who out of ignorance does not observe a papal constitution?

On the third we proceed as follows: it seems that he who acts against a papal constitution through ignorance, does not sin.

1. For as Augustine says, sin is voluntary to the extent that if there is no voluntary, then there is no sin. But ignorance causes the involuntary, as is said in Ethica 3, 50 Therefore, what is done through ignorance is not a sin.

2. Further, according to the laws a lord can reclaim his appointed servant after a certain time. This, however, ought to be computed from the time of its being known, not from the time of the decree. Therefore, the obligation to a papal constitution binds from the time of its being known.

But to the contrary: ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone. But a papal constitution makes the law so he who acts against a papal constitution through ignorance is not excused.

I answer: it must be stated that the ignorance which is the cause of an act causes the involuntary, hence it always excuses unless the ignorance iself is a sin, which happens when someone does not know what he is able to know and he is obliged to know. Now indeed everyone is obliged to know the papal constitution in his fashion. If, therefore, someone does not know this through negligence, he is not excused from blame if he acts against the constitution. If indeed there was a sufficient obstacle to someone’s knowing it, e.g., if he was in prison or in foreign lands which the constitution did not reach, or because of something similar, such ignorance excuses so that he does not sin by acting against the pope’s constitution.

The response to the objections is clear.

Parallel passages: ST 1-2, q. 90, a.4; De ver., q. 17, a.3; De malo, q. 3. a.7 and

Article 4: Whether a monk sins mortally in eating meat?

Concerning the fourth we proceed as follows: it seems that a monk sins mortally in eating meat.

1. For the canon law De consecratione, d. 5, in the chapter “Carnem.“ says that monks ought not to eat meat and if they do the contrary they ought to be incarcerated. But such punishment is only inflicted for a mortal sin, therefore monks sin mortally in eating meat.

2. Moreover, it is a mortal sin to act against a vow. But monks are obligated from a vow to keep blessed Benedict’s Rule in which it is said that monks should abstain from meat. Therefore, monks sin mortally in eating meat.

But to the contrary: no mortal sin is allowed anyone by reason of an infirmity, but eating meat is allowed a monk by reason of infirmity. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin for a monk to eat meat.

I answer: it must be stated that essentially speaking, nothing is a mortal sin for any monk or religious which is not a mortal sin for another person except it be contrary to what the very vow of the profession obligated him; accidentally speaking, however because it provides an occasion for sin, something can be a sin for him which would not be a sin for another person. Therefore we must consider what it is to which a religious is bound by the vow of profession.

If indeed a religious in making profession vowed he was going to observe the Rule. he would seem to obligate himself by the vow to the individual matters which are contained in the Rule and so. in acting against any of them, he would sin mortally. From this it would follow that the state of religious life would be a snare of mortal sin to the religious which he would scarcely or never be able to avoid. Therefore, the holy fathers who instituted the orders, not wanting men to embrace the snare of damnation but rather the way of salvation, arranged such a form of profession in which that danger could not exist, as in the Order of Friars Preachers there is the most careful and secure form of avowal which does not involve a promise to observe the Rule but “obedience according to the Rule.” Hence from the vow they are obligated to observe those matters which are put in the Rule as precepts and which the prelate according to the tenor of the Rule wanted to command. Other matters which are not contained in the Rule under a precept do not fall directly under the vow 50 that one does not sin mortally in omitting those.

The blessed Benedict indeed did not decree that a monk should promise to observe the Rule, but he decreed that the one professing promise the conversion of his morals according to the Rule. This is what is expressed: that he direct his morals according to the Rule, which he acts against if he transgresses either the precepts in the Rule or even holds the Rule in contempt by refusing to direct his acts entirely according to it. But not all points contained in the Rule are precepts, for some are warnings or counsels; some however are orders or statutes such as that no one may speak after Compline. Such statutes, however, which are contained in the Rule do not have the power of precepts. Neither does a prelate in decreeing something always intend to bind someone under pain of mortal sin through the precept. Now the prelate is a sort of living rule. So it would be foolish to hold that a monk breaking silence after Compline sins mortally, unless perhaps he does this against a precept of the prelate or from contempt of the Rule. Abstention from meat, however, is not included in blessed Benedict’s Rule as a precept but as a sort of statute, hence a monk in eating meat does not from this very act sin mortally, except in the case of disobedience or contempt.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that punishment is inflicted on a monk for obstinately and disobediently eating meat.

To the second it must be stated that eating meat is not against a monk vow except when he eats it out of disobedience or contempt.

What is objected on the contrary side has no efficacy for it holds good concerning these things which are bad in themselves, such as homicide, adultery and the like, which are illicit for ah, the healthy as well as the infirm. It does not, however, hold good concerning these things which are bad because they are prohibited, for something can be prohibited for the healthy which is not prohibited for the sick.

Parallel passage: ST 2-2, q. 186, a.9.

QUESTION 10: Then with regard to the good in the order of glory two questions were asked about glorified bodies:

1. Whether a glorified body can exist naturaily in the same place with another nonglorified body?

2. Whether this can be accomplished miraculously?

Article 1: Whether a glorified body can exist naturally in the same place with another non glorified body?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that a glorified body can naturally exist in the same place with another body.

1. For if it is prohibited from existing in the same place with an other, it is either because of density or fleshiness, or because of dimensions. But it is not because of density or fleshiness because a glorified body will be spiritual according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:44); hikewise it is not because of dimensions either, for since things that touch each other are those whose ends are together, it is necessary for a point of one natural body to be together with a point of another, and a line with a line, and a surface with a surface. Therefore for the same reason a body with a body also. Therefore, a glorified body is not prohibited from being able to exist naturally with another body in the same place.

2. Moreover, the Commentator says on Physica 8, 4 that the parts of air and water partly penetrate each other because they are partly of a spiritual nature. But glorified bodies will be entirely spiritual as we already said, therefore they will be able to penetrate other bodies totally and likewise exist with them.

But to the contrary: glorification does not remove a nature. But a human body cannot naturally exist together with another body in the same place in this state, therefore neither can it after it is glorified.

I answer: it must be stated that it is clear that a human body in this state cannot exist in the same place with another body. If, therefore, a glorified body can naturally exist with another body in the same place because of some property engrafted on it, that property removes this which prohibits the human body’s existing in the same place with another body in this state. We must, therefore, consider what such a prohibiting factor may be.

Some say that this property is a density or fleshiness which is removed through the dowry 0f glory which they name subtlety. But this is not intelligible for we cannot ascertain what such fleshiness or density is. It is not a quality because there is no quality which when it is removed the body to which it belongs can exist with another body in the same place. Likewise it cannot be the form or matter which are parts of the essence, because then the whole essence of the human body would not remain in glory, which is a heretical opinion. Therefore, we must say that the prohibiting factor is nothing but the dimensions which corporeal matter sustains. For it is necessary that that which is of itself be the cause in any genus; however, distinction according to position first and of itself belongs to dimensional quantity which is defined as quantity having position, and that whence the parts in a subject, from this [fact] that they are subject to dimension, have a distinction according to position. And just as there is a distinction of diverse parts of one body according to the diverse parts of one place through dimensions, so because of dimensions diverse bodies are distinguished according to diverse places. For actual division makes two bodies of physical matter, however potential divisibility makes two parts of one body, hence the Philosopher says in Physica 4, 8 that just as when a wooden cube is inserted into water or air it necessarily displaces only water or air, so it would be necessary that if we posited a void, the separated dimensions would displace it. Therefore, since glory does not remove a body’s dimensions, I say that a glorified body cannot naturally exist with another body in the same place because of any engrafted property.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that as was said, a human body in that state is prohibited from existing with another body in the same place not because of a fleshiness or density which is removed through glory (for the Apostle opposes spirituality to the animality according to which a body needs nourishment, as Augustine says; however, he does not oppose it to fleshiness or density) but it is impeded because of the dimensions. Indeed the reason which is given on the contrary side is placed among the sophistical reasons by the Philosopher in Physica 4, 1, for place is not owing to a point, a line, and a surface, but to a body. So it does not follow that if the boundaries of bodies are touching each other at the same time that because of this fact many bodies can exist in the same place.

To the second it must be stated as the Commentator says in the same place, that penetration is made through condensation and they are said to have spiritual power because of rarity. However, it would be erroneous to say that glorified bodies are spiritual in this way because they are similar to air and wind, as is clear through what Gregory says in Moralium 14, 55.

Parallel passages: the next article; Suppl., q. 83, a.4.

Article 2: Whether this can be accomplished miraculously?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that a glorified body can in no way exist with another body in the same place at the same time.

1. For just as one body is related to one place, so are two bodies to two places. Therefore, with substitutions, just as one body is related to two places so are two bodies to one place. But one body can in no way exist in two places, therefore neither can two bodies exist in one place.

2. Moreover, if two bodies exist in one place then two points are assumed in the two extremities of the place. It follows, therefore, that between these two points there will be two straight lines of the two bodies existing in the same place, which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for two bodies to exist in the same place.

But to the contrary: it is said in John 20 that Christ entered where his disciples were though the doors were closed, which cannot be unless his body existed in the same place simultaneously with the corporeal doors. A glorified body can, therefore, exist with another body in the same place.

I answer: it must be stated that, as we already said, two bodies are prohibited by their dimensions from existing in the same place because corporeal matter is divided according to dimensions; how ever dimensions are distinguished according to position. But God, who is the first cause of everything, can conserve an effect in existence without its proximate causes. Hence, just as he conserves accidents without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, so can he conserve distinction of corporeal matter and the dimensions in it without diversity of place. Therefore, it can be miraculously accomplished that two bodies exist in the same place. So the saints attributed to Christ’s body that it existed through the closed womb of the Virgin and entered through closed doors by means of divine power. And I say likewise that a glorified body which will be fashion ed in conformity with Christ’s radiant body will be able to exist with another body in the same place, not because of some engrafted created power but only with the aid and action of the divine power, just as the body of Peter cured the sick by its shadow, but was per forming miracles with the aid of divine power.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that we must employ it thus with the proportion changed: as the first is related to the second as two to three, so is the third related to the fourth. Therefore, with substitutions, as the first is related to the third so also is the second to the fourth, i.e., three to six. And the reasoning should proceed according to this thus: as one body is related to one place so are two bodies to two places. and therefore as one body to two bodies, so one place to two places. And so it does not follow that if one body cannot exist in two places that two bodies cannot exist in one place. One body’s existing in two places implies a contradiction because it pertains to the intelligible structure of place to be the boundary of the thing in place. However, a boundary is that outside of which nothing belongs to the thing, hence nothing of the thing in a place can exist in an exterior place. Because if it is maintained that it exists in two places, it follows that it is outside its own place and so it follows that it is in a place and not in a place. Nor is there a valid disclaimer concerning Christ’s body because it is not in the sacrament of the altar by way of place but rather through conversion.

To the second it must be stated that for two straight mathematical lines to be between two points is impossible because we can under stand no reason for their distinction except position. But for two natural lines to be between two points is indeed naturally impossible but possible through a miracle because there is another reason for the distinction of the two lines from the diversity of the underlying bodies which are conserved by divine power even when diversity of position is removed.

Parallel passages: ST 3, q. 54, al. ad 1; q. 57, a.4, ad 2; Suppl., q. 83, aa.3-4; CG 4, c. 87; In Ioann., c. 20, lect. 4; 1 ad Cor., c. 15, lect. 6.

SECOND QUODLIBET

Questions were asked concerning Christ, angels, and men.

QUESTION 1: Concerning Christ, two questions were asked about his passion:

1. Whether he was numerically the same man during the three days of death?

2. Whether any suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind without death?

Article 1: Whether Christ was the same man during the three days of death?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that Christ was the same man during the three days.

1. For Matthew 12:40 says, “As Jonah was in the belly of the whale for three days and three nights, so will the son of man be in the heart of the earth.’ But the son of man in the heart of the earth was not other than the son of man who spoke on earth, otherwise Christ would have been two sons. Therefore, he was the same man during the three days of death.

2. Further, Jonah was the same man in the whale’s belly as he was before. But as Jonah was in the whale’s belly so was Christ in the heart of the earth. Therefore Christ was also the same man.

But to the contrary: if the form of the part is removed, the form of the whole which results from the composition of form and matter is removed. Now during the three days of death Christ’s soul was separated from his body, therefore his humanity ceased to exist. So he was not numerically the same man during the three days of death.

I answer: it must be said that three substances were united in Christ — body, soul, and divinity. Now body and soul were not only united in one person but in one nature, but divinity could not be united in a nature either to soul or body because, since it is the most perfect nature, it cannot be a part of any nature. Yet it was united to body and soul in the person. In death, however, Christ’s soul was separated from his body, otherwise his death would not have been a true death, for by definition death is the separation of the soul from the body on which it bestows life. But divinity was not separated from either the body or the soul, which is clear from the Creed which says of the Son of God that “He was buried and descended into hell.” However, the body lying in the tomb and the soul descending into hell would not be attributed to the Son of God unless these two were joined to him in a unity of person or hypostasis.

And therefore, we can speak of Christ during the three days of death in two ways: with regard to the hypostasis or person, and in this way he is during the three days absolutely numerically the same as he was; or with regard to the human nature, and this in two ways. If we speak with regard to the whole nature which is called humanity, Christ was not a man during the three days of death and so neither the same nor another man, but rather the same hypostasis. If we speak with regard to a part of the human nature, his soul was indeed entirely the same numerically because it was not transformed in substance; the body was numerically the same according to matter but not according to the substantial form which is the soul. So we cannot say that he was absolutely numerically the same because any substantial difference excludes absolute sameness. However, animate is a substantial difference and therefore to die is to be corrupted and not only to be altered. Nor on the other hand can we say that he was absolutely non identical or other because he was not non identical or other according to his whole substance. We must therefore say that he was the same in one respect and not the same in another respect, for he was the same with respect to matter but not the same with respect to form.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that ‘man’ denotes a nature, but son’ denotes a hypostasis and so Christ can be called ‘son of man’ rather than ‘man’ during the three days of death.

To the second it must be said that that passage does not mean likeness with regard to everything but only with regard to occupation [of a place], for Christ was dead in the heart of the earth but Jonah was not dead in the whale’s belly.

Parallel passages: 3 Sent., d. 22, q.l, ai; Quodlibet 4, q. 5; ST 3, q. 50, a.4; Comp. theol., c. 229.

Article 2: Whether any other suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind without his death?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that no other suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind without his death.

1. For the Apostle says in Galatians 2:21, “If there is justice from the law then Christ died in vain,” that is uselessly and without cause.

But if any other suffering sufficed then Christ died in vain. Now the Apostle regards this as inadmissible. Therefore, no other suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind.

2. Moreover, that is said to be bought which is procured for a just price. Now a just price for the sin of the first parent by which mankind was sold into bondage could not be other than the life of Christ which is worth the lives of all men, which lives are removed through that sin. for through the first man’s sin death entered into all, as Romans 5 says. Therefore, mankind could not have been redeemed through any other suffering of Christ without his death.

3. Further, Gregory says in Moralium 3, 14 that “unless Christ had taken on himself an undeserved death, by no means would he free us from a deserved death.” Therefore, no other suffering would have sufficed for mankind’s liberation without his death.

4. Further, the Apostle says in Hebrews 10:14, that Christ “by one offering perfected forever those who are sanctified,” and therefore there is no place for a second offering. But it is clear that Christ sustained many kinds 0f suffering before death — hungering, laboring, being spat upon, being beaten. If, therefore, these sufferings had sufficed he would not have offered himself for death. Yet he offered himself as a sacrifice to God for our sins. as is said in Ephesians 5, and this he did through his death. Therefore the suffering of Christ without his death would not have sufficed.

But to the contrary: anyone’s injury or suffering is measured from the dignity of his person, for a king suffers a greater injury if he is struck in the face than does any private person. But the dignity of Christ’s person is infinite because he is a divine person; so any suffering of his, however little it be, is infinite. Therefore, any suffering of his would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind even without his death. Moreover, Bernard says that the least drop of Christ’s blood would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind. However, a drop of Christ’s blood could have been shed without his death, so even without his death he could have redeemed mankind through any suffering.

I answer: it must be said that two things are required for buying, namely the amount of the price and its allotment for buying something. For if someone should give a price not equivalent for acquiring something, there is not said to be a purchase absolutely but partly a purchase and partly a gift. For example, if someone should buy a book which is worth twenty libras for ten, he would partly buy the book and it would partly be given to him. On the other hand, if he should give an even greater price and not allot it for buying he would not be said to buy the book. Therefore, if we speak of mankind’s redemption with regard to the amount of the price, so any suffering of Christ, even without his death, would have sufficed for the redemption of mankind because of the infinite dignity of the person. And in this manner the last two reasons proceed. If, however, we speak with regard to the allotment of the price, we must say that Christ’s other sufferings without his death are not allotted for the redemption of mankind by God the Father and Christ. And there are three reasons for this. First, in order that the price of mankind’s redemption might not only be infinite in value but also of the same genus, i.e., in order that he might redeem us from death through death. Second, in order that Christ’s death might not only be the price of the redemption but also an example of virtue, namely in order that men should not fear to die for the truth. And the Apostle assigns these two causes in Hebrews 2:14-15 saying, “In order that through death he might destroy him who had command of death,” as concerns the first, “and might free them who through their whole lives were subject to servitude through the fear of death,” as regards the second. Third, in order that his death might also be a sacrament of salvation while we die to sin and carnal desires and our own feelings by the power of Christ’s death. And this cause is assigned in 1 Peter 3:18: “Christ died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, in order that he might offer us to God, dead indeed in the flesh but brought to life in the spirit.” And therefore, mankind is not redeemed through any other suffering without the death of Christ.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that Christ’s death is not allotted for the redemption of mankind without cause, although a lesser suffering could have sufficed as we said.

To the second it must be said that Christ would have paid a sufficient price for mankind’s redemption not by paying with his life but even by undergoing any suffering if a lesser one had been divinely allotted for this. And this is because of the infinite dignity of the person of Christ, as we said.

The other two reasons proceed from the fact that Christ’s other sufferings were not allotted so that mankind would be redeemed through them without Christ’s death.

Parallel passages: ST 3, q. 46, a.2; q. 50, aI; q. 52, ai; CG 4, c. 55; Comp. theol., c. 227; Contra errores Graecorum etc., e. 7; 3 Sent., d. 20, a.3.

Then questions were asked about angels: first as to their composition, second as to the time of their motion.

QUESTION 2: Concerning the composition of angels two questions were asked:

1. Whether an angel is a composite of essence and being (esse) in the manner of a substance?

2. Whether supposit and nature are diverse in an angel?

Article 1: Whether an angel is composed of essence and being (esse) in the manner of a substance?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that an angel is not composed of essence and being in the manner of a substance.

1. For the essence of an angel is the angel itself, because the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself. If, therefore, an angel were composed of being and essence, it would be composed of itself and another. But this is incoherent. So it is not composed of being and essence in the manner of a substance.

2. Moreover, no accident enters into the substantial composition of a substance. But an angel’s being is an accident, for Hilary attributes properly to God in De trinitate, 7 that being is not an accident in him but is subsisting truth. Therefore, an angel is not composed of essence and being in the manner of an essence.

But to the contrary: the commentary on De causis, Prop. 7 says that “An intelligence, which we call an angel. has essence and being.”

I answer: it must be said that something is predicated of something in two ways — in the manner of an essence or in the manner of participation. ‘Light’ is predicated of an illumined body in the manner of participation, but if there were some separated light then it would be predicated of it in the manner of an essence. Therefore, we must say that ‘being’ (cas) is predicated in the manner of an essence of God alone, inasmuch a divine being (esse) is subsistent and absolute being. However, it is predicated of any creature in the manner of participation, for no creature is its being but rather is something which has being.’ So also we cal1 God ‘good’ in the manner of an essence because he is goodness itself, we call creatures ‘good’ in the manner of participation because they have goodness. For anything is good inasmuch as it is, according to what Augustine says in De doctrina christiana 1, 32, that inasmuch as we are we are good. However, whenever something is predicated of another in the manner of participation, it is necessary that there be something in the latter besides that in which it participates. And therefore, in any creature the creature itself which has being and its very being are other, and this is what Boethius says in De hebdomabidus, that being and what is are diverse in all entities except the first.’°

But it must be known that something is participated in two ways. In one way it is participated in as though belonging to the substance of the thing participating, as a genus is participated in by a species of it. However, a creature does not participate in being this way for that belongs to the substance of a thing which enters into its definition, but being (ens) is not included in the definition of a creature because it is neither a genus nor a difference. So it is participated in as something not belonging to the thing’s essence.” And therefore. the question ‘Is it?’ is different from the question ‘What is it?’ So, since all that is outside a thing’s essence may be called an accident. the being which pertains to the question ‘Is it?’ is an accident. Therefore, the Commentator says on Metaphysica 5, 7 op. 8 that this proposition, ‘Socrates is,’ is an accidental predication when it signifies either a thing’s being (entitatem) or the truth of a proposition.’

But it is true that this noun ‘being’ (ens), when it signifies a thing to which such being (esse) is attributable, signifies the thing’s essence and according to this signification being is divided into the ten categories. But it does not signify univocally because it is not attributable to all things by the same intelligible notion but is attributable to substance through itself (per se) and to the other categories in another fashion.’ Therefore, if there is composition in an angel of essence and being, this is not a composition as from the parts of a substance but as from a substance and what adheres to the substance.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that sometimes a third thing results from those which are joined together; as the humanity by which a man is a man is constituted from soul and body so a man is composed of soul and body.’ Sometimes, however, a third thing does not result from those which are joined together but a kind of composite intelligible notion results, as when the notions ‘man’ and ‘which go to make up the intelligible notion ‘white man’. And in such things something is composed of itself and another, just as a white thing is composed of that which is white and whiteness.

To the second it must be said that being is an accident, not as though related accidentally to a substance, but as the actuality of any substance. Hence God himself, who is his own actuality, is his own being.’

Parallel passages: sr 2, d. 3. q.l. aI; CG 2, c. 52; De pot., q. 7, a.4.

Article 2: Whether supposit and nature are the same in an angel?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that supposit and nature are the same in an angel.

1. For in these things which are composed of matter and form, supposit and nature differ because the supposit adds individual matter to the nature of the species. This cannot be the case in an angel if the angel is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, supposit and nature do not differ in an angel.

2. But it was objected that in an angel the supposit differs from the nature inasmuch as the supposit is understood as something which has being but the nature is not. But to the contrary: just as being is not put in the definition of a nature so it would not be put in the definition of a supposit or singular if the supposit or singular were defined. Therefore. the supposit does not differ from the nature through being so supposit and nature differ in no way.

But to the contrary: in all creatures a nature constitutes a supposit. But nothing constitutes itself, so in no creature are supposit and nature the same.

I answer: it must be stated that in order to understand this question, it is necessary to consider what supposit and nature are.’ Although we speak of nature in many ways, in one way we call the very substance of a thing the nature. insofar as ‘substance’ signifies a thing’s essence or quiddity or what a thing is, as is said in Metaphysica 5, 4., Therefore, as we use the term here ‘nature’ signifies what a definition signifies. Thus Boethius in Liber contra Eutychen, c. 1 says that “nature is anything which a specific difference gives form to,” for the specific difference completes the definition.’ But a supposit is a singular in the category of substance, and is called a hypostasis or first substance. And because sensible substances composed of matter and form are better known to us, let us first see how essence or nature is related to supposit in them.

Some say that the form of the part is really the same as the form of the whole which is called the essence or nature and differs from it only conceptually. For it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it makes matter actually exist, but the form of the whole inasmuch as it constitutes the species. Thus the soul is called the form of the part inasmuch as it makes the body actually exist, and likewise the form of the whole inasmuch as it constitutes the human species (and in this way it is called humanity). And according to this position, in things composed of matter and form the nature is part of the supposit for the supposit is an individual composed of matter and form, as we said.

But the aforementioned position does not seem to be true because the nature or essence is that which a definition signifies. Yet a definition in natural things signifies not only form but also matter, as is said in Metaphysica 7, 6. Nor can it be said that matter is put in the definition of a natural thing as something not belonging to its essence, for it is proper to an accident to be defined through something which is not its essence, namely through its subject, and therefore it has essence incompletely as Metaphysica 7, 3 says. The only remaining possibility, therefore. is that in things composed of matter and form the essence or nature is not the form alone but the composite of matter and form.

It remains to be considered whether, since a supposit or natural individual is composed of matter and form, it is the same as its essence or nature. And the Philosopher raises the question in Metaphysica 7, 6 where he inquires whether a thing and its quiddity are the same. And he determines that in cases of per se predication they are the same, but where there is predication per accidens, they are not the same. For a man is nothing other than that which is essential to man. for ‘man’ signifies nothing but a biped animal capable of walking. But a white thing is not entirely the same as the essence white which is signified by the term ‘white’ for ‘white’ only signifies a quality, as is said in the Categoriae, 5; however a white thing is a substance which has a quality. Therefore, in the case of anything to which something which does not belong to the intelligible structure of its nature can be accidental, the thing and the essence, or the supposit and the nature, differ. For in the signification of the nature is included only that which belongs to the intelligible structure of the species. But the supposit not only has what belongs to the intelligible structure of the species, but also other characteristics which are accidental to it. And therefore, the supposit is signified in the manner of a whole; however the nature or quiddity is signified as a formal part of it.

In God alone, however, no accident is found outside his essence because his being is his essence, as we said. And therefore in God supposit and nature are entirely the same. But in an angel they are not entirely the same because something outside what belongs to the intelligible structure of its species is accidental to it, both because the very being of an angel is outside its essence or nature, and some other characteristics which belong entirely to the supposit are accidental to it but not to the nature.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that not only in composites of matter and form do we find some accident outside the essence of the species itself, but also in spiritual substances which are not composed of matter and form. And therefore, in both the supposit is not entirely the same as the nature itself. However, it happens differently in each case for something is taken as an accident outside the intelligible structure of a thing in two ways. In one way because it does not enter into the definition signifying the essence of the thing but is. however, designative or determinative of some one of the essential principles. In this way rational is accidental to animal as belonging outside its definition and is. nonetheless, essentially determinative of ‘animal’ hence it is essential to a man and belongs to the intelligible structure of a man. In the other way something is accidental to something because it is neither in its definition nor determinative of any of its essential principles. In this way whiteness is accidental to a man. Therefore, in both ways something which belongs outside the intelligible structure of the species is accidental to those things which are composed of matter and form. For since the intelligible structure of the human species comprehends man’s composition of soul and body, the determination of body and soul which is from this soul and this body is outside the intelligible structure of the species and is accidental to a man as a man. But it is attributable of itself to this man to whose intelligible structure it would belong, if he were defined, that he be from this soul and this body, just as it pertains to the intelligible structure of man in general that he be composed of a soul and a body. Many other characteristics outside the intelligible structure of the species which are not determinative of the essential principles are also accidental to composites of matter and form. Some characteristics outside the intelligible structure of the species which are not determinative of the essential principles are accidental to created immaterial substances, as we said. However, some charac teristics which are determinative of the species’ essence are not accidental to them because the very nature of the species is not individuated through matter but through itselfoniy, froni the fact that such a form is not suited to being received in any matter; whence through itself only it is not capable of multiplication nor predicable of many. But because such a substance is not its being, something outside the intelligible structure of the species is accidental to it, namely being itself and certain other characteristics which are attributed to the supposit and not to the nature. Thus in such a substance the supposit is not entirely the same as the nature.

To the second it must be said that not everything outside the intelligible structure of the species which is accidental to something is determinative of the very essence so that it is necessarily included in its intelligible structure, as we said. And therefore, although being itself does not belong to a supposit’s intelligible structure. yet because it belongs to the supposit and does not belong to the nature’s intelligible structure, it is clear that supposit and nature are not entirely the same in any cases in which a thing is not its being.

To that which is objected on the contrary side it must be said that in composites of matter and form also a nature is said to constitute a supposit, not because a nature is one thing and a supposit another (for this is the case according to the opinion of those who say that the nature of a species is only the form which constitutes the supposit as a whole), but because according to the manner of signifying, a nature is signified as a part for the aforesaid reason and a supposit is signified as a whole. A nature is signified as what constitutes, a supposit as what is constituted.

Parailelpassages: ISent., d. 8, q.9, a.5, qc 2; d. 25, q.l,ad 3; 3, d. 5,q.i,a.3; Spir.creat.,a.5,ad9 a.4; q. 9, a.l.

QUESTION 3: Then it was asked about the time through which God moves a spiritual creature, according to Augustine.

Article: Whether the time which moves a spiritual creature and the time which measures a temporal creature are the same?

Whether the time which moves a spiritual creature is the same as the time which measures the motions of corporeal things: it seems so.

l. Because neither Augustine nor any other philosopher ascribes a diversity of times. Therefore, it seems fruitless to do so.

2. Moreover, everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is one. If then there is not one time but diverse times, there will be no being, which is incoherent. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain only one time.

But to the contrary:

l. the time by which corporeal motions are measured is the numbering of the motion of the first heaven, according to the Philosopher in Physica 4, 12. But the time through which angels are moved does not have any relation to motion. Therefore that time is other than the time of corporeal things.

2. Moreover, nothing is common to what is perpetual and what is perishable except in name, as is said in Metaphysica 10, 10. But angels are perpetual, and bodies are perishable. Therefore, their times are not the same.

I answer: it must be said that, as Augustine says in De civitate Dei 11, c. 6, there would not have been times unless there were a creature which changed something by some motion. Time follows on this change when things which are diverse and cannot exist simultaneously move and succeed one another. From this what the Philosopher says in Physica 4, 11 is also understood: “It is necessary to speak of time according to the intelligible structure of motion, for time is the numbering of motion according to before and after.” Therefore. all motions which can be measured by one measure have one time and if there are motions which cannot be measured by one measure. then necessarily their times are diverse. However, since a measure is of like kind with what is measured, as Metaphysica 10, 1 says, it is clear that all that belong to one genus can have one common measure, but what belong to diverse genera cannot. Now all continuous motions belong to one genus insofar as they are commensurable, and therefore they can have one common measure. For ah are measured by the simplest in their genus, namely by the fastest motion of the first heaven, so there can be one common time for all continuous motions. This time indeed, although it seems to belong to the genus of the numbering of discrete things, because it is the numbering of these continuous things, namely motions, it becomes also itself continuous, just as ten simply understood is something discrete but ten lengths of cloth are something continuous. However, there cannot be one common measure of discrete and continuous things since it belongs to diverse genera insofar as they are measurable. And therefore it is necessary, if there be some non continuous motions, that their time be other than the motion by which continuous motions are measured.

But clearly the motions of spiritual creatures, of which Augustine speaks when he says spiritual creatures are moved through time and not through place, are not continuous motions but certain discrete changes. For he says that a mind is moved through time either by remembering what was forgotten, or by learning what it did not know, or by willing what it did not will. So it is clear that since time has continuity only from motion, such time has no continuum and is different from the time of corporeal things.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that Augustine makes the difference of times understood from the very difference of the motions.

To the second it must be said that something is one in that way in which it is said to exist. For what is said to exist according to species is one in species but not in number. So it does not follow that if there are many men that the species man does not exist. And likewise it does not follow that if there are many times time does not exist.

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 10, q. 2; ST 1, q. 10, a.5; De pot., q. 3, a.14, ad 18; 1 Sent., d. 8, q.2, a.2; d. i9, q.2, ai; 2 Sent., d. 2, q.l, al.

***

Then questions were asked concerning man: first as to the virtues, second as to sins, third as to punishments. Concerning the virtues, however, questions were asked both in relation to divine matters and human matters.

QUESTION 4: Three questions were asked with regard to virtues in relation to divine matters:

1. Concerning faith, whether someone would be bound to believe a Christ who did not perform visible miracles?

2. concerning the sacrament of faith, whether the children of Jews are to be baptized when their parents are unwilling?

3. concerning tithes which are owed to ministers of the sacraments, whether someone can be excused from paying tithes because of a custom?

Article 1: Whether men ought to have believed a Christ who did not perform visible miracles?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that men were not bound to believe a Christ who did not perform visible miracles.

1. For whoever does not do this to which he is bound, sins. But if men did not believe a Christ who did not perform miracles, they did not sin. Christ himself says in John 15:24, “If I had not done among them works which no one else did, they would not have had sin,” and according to Augustine In iohannis evangelium, tr. 91 he is speaking of the sin of lack of faith. Therefore, men would not have been bound to believe Christ if he had not performed miracles.

2. Moreover, only a lawmaker or someone higher than him can change the law. But Christ taught some things which seemed to pertain to the abolition of the Old Law, such as that foods do not defile a man and that it is permissible to work on the sabbath. If, therefore, he had not proved himself to be a lawmaker, it would not have been necessary to believe him. But he could not have proved this except through miracles since many miracles had preceded the law making. Therefore, it was not necessary to believe Christ unless he had performed miracles.

But to the contrary:

3. Men are obligated to believe the first truth more than visible signs. But even though Christ had not performed miracles, he himself, being the true God, was the first truth. Therefore, even if he had not performed miracles, it was still necessary to believe him.

4. Moreover, the grace of union is greater than the grace which sanctifies. But miracles do not sufficiently prove a sanctifying grace because, as Matthew 7:22 says to those who say to Christ at judgment, “Lord. We did many wonderful things in your name,” it will be answered, “I did not know you.” Therefore, much less do miracles suffice to prove a grace of union. If then men were not bound to believe Christ without miracles, even when miracles were performed they were not bound to believe the one who said he was God, which is clearly false.

I answer: it must be stated that no one is bound to what is above his powers except in the manner in which it is possible for him. However, believing is above man’s natural power. Hence it arises from a gift of God, according to what the Apostle says in Ephesians 2:8. “For by grace you are saved through faith not from yourselves for it is the gift of God,” and in Philippians 1:29, “It is given you not only to believe in him but to suffer for him as well.” A man, therefore, is bound to believe insofar as he is helped by God to believe.

Now God helps someone to believe in three ways. First through an inner calling, concerning which John 6:45 says, “Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me.” and Romans 8:30 says, “Whom he predestined, these also he called.” Second through outer teaching and preaching, according to the Apostle in Romans 10:17, “Faith comes from hearing, hearing however through the word of Christ.” Third through outer miracles, whence 1 Cor. 14:22 says that signs are given to those lacking faith in order that they may be roused to faith through them. If Christ had not performed visible miracles, however, there still remained other ways of drawing to faith to which men would be bound to give assent. For men were bound to believe the authority of the law and the prophets. They were also bound not to resist an inner calling, as Isaiah 50:5 says concerning himself, “The Lord God opened my ear, but I did not resist nor turn away back,” (as Acts 7:51 says concerning some, “You always resist the Holy Spirit”).

Therefore, to the first it must be said that among those works which Christ performed among men, we should also count the inner calling by which he drew some people. Gregory says in a homily that Christ through compassion drew Mary Magdalene from within whom he also received through gentleness without. We should also count his teaching since he himself also says (John 15:22), “If I had not come and spoken to them they had had no sin.”

To the second it must be said that Christ was able to show himself to be a lawmaker, not only by performing visible miracles, but also through the authority of scripture and through inner inspiration.

To the third it must be said that the inner inspiration by which Christ could manifest himself without outer miracles pertains to the power of the first truth which illuminates and teaches man inwardly.

To the fourth it must be said that visible miracles are performed by divine power in order to strengthen the virtue of faith, whence Mark 16:20 says concerning the apostles that “they preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the words with signs that followed.” However, miracles are not always performed in order to demonstrate the grace of him through whom they are performed. And therefore it can happen that someone without the grace which sanctifies may perform miracles. But it cannot happen that someone announcing a false doctrine should perform a true miracle which can only be performed by divine power. for thus God would be a witness to falsehood, which is impossible. Therefore, when Christ called himself the son of God and equal to God, the miracles which he performed confirmed his teaching, and Christ was shown to be God through them. However Peter, although he performed the same or greater miracles, was not proved to be God but through them also Christ was proved to be God because Peter did not teach that he himself, but rather Jesus Christ, was God.

Parallel passages: ST 3, q. 43, a.4; In Ioann., c. 15, lectio 5.

Article 2: Whether the children of Jews should be baptized when their parents are unwilling ?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that the children of Jews should be baptized when their parents are unwilling for them to be.

1. For the marriage bond is greater than the right of parental power because parental power can be dissolved by man when a child is emancipated, but the marriage bond cannot be dissolved by man, according to Matthew 19:6, “Let man not separate whom God has joined together.” The marriage bond is dissolved because of lack of belief, for the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 7:15, “Because if an unbeliever departs. let him depart, for a brother or a sister is not bound in such cases,” and canon law says that if an unbelieving spouse does not want to cohabit with the other, without affront to the creator, then the other spouse is not obligated to cohabit with him or her.”

Therefore, much more is the right of parental power removed because of lack of belief. So then, unbelieving Jews do not have the right of parental power over their children. Their children can therefore be baptized when the parents are unwilling.

2. Moreover, we ought more to aid men against the danger of eternal death than against the danger of temporal death. But if someone saw a man in danger of temporal death and did not aid him, he would sin. So since the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of eternal death if they are left to their parents who instruct them in their lack of belief, it seems that they should be removed from them and baptized and instructed in the faith.

3. Moreover, slaves’ children are slaves and in the power of their lords. But Jews are slaves of kings and princes, therefore so are their children, hence kings and princes have the power to do what they want concerning the children of Jews. Therefore, there would be no harm if they were baptized when their parents are unwilling.

4. Further, any man belongs more to God from whom he has his soul than to his parent of the flesh from whom he has his body. So it is not unjust if the children of Jews be removed from their parents of the flesh and consecrated to God through baptism.

5. Further, baptism is more efficacious for salvation than is preaching because through baptism the stain of sin and guilt of punishment are removed at once, and the door of heaven is opened. But if danger follows from lack of preaching it is imputed to him who did not preach, as is said in Ezekiel 3:18 and 33:6 concerning the man who saw the sword coming and did not sound the trumpet. Therefore, if the children of Jews are damned because of lack of baptism, all the more is it imputed as a sin to those who could baptize and did not.

But to the contrary: harm must be done to no one. Now it would harm the Jews if their children were baptized when they were unwilling, because they would lose the right of parental power over their children as soon as the children joined the believers. Therefore, they must not be baptized when their parents are unwilling.

I answer: it must be said that the custom of the Church has the greatest authority which must always be followed in all things, because even the very teaching of the catholic theologians has authority from the Church. Hence we should stand more on the - Church’s custom than on the authority of Augustine or Jerome or any teacher. Now the Church never had the practice of baptizing the children of Jews when their parents were unwilling, although in past times there were many very powerful catholic princes such as Constantine, Theodosius, and many others with whom very holy bishops were friendly, such as Silvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius. These princes would not have neglected to obtain [the power] from them if this were harmonious with reason. And therefore it seems dangerous to assert anew, contrary to the custom so far observed in the Church, that the children of Jews may be baptized when their parents are unwilling.

There are two reasons for this. One is because of the danger to the faith. For if children who do not yet have the use of reason undertake baptism, later when they arrive at adulthood they may easily be led by their parents to relinquish what they undertook when ignorant, and this might be turned to the detriment of the faith. The other reason is that it is contrary to natural justice. For a child naturally belongs to his parents. At first he is not distinguished from his parent physically so long as he is contained in his mother’s womb. Later, after he passes out of the womb and before he has the use of free choice, he is in the care of his parents as in a kind of spiritual womb. For as long as a child does not have the use of reason he does not differ from a non rational animal in what he does. So, just as a cow or a horse belongs by civil law or the law of the people to the owner so that he may use it when he wants as his own instrument, so according to natural law a child before he has the use of reason is under his parents’ care. It would then be against natural justice if a child before he had the use of free choice were taken away from his parents’ care or if something were ordered concerning him against his parents’ will. However, after he begins to have the use of free choice he begins to be his own person and can provide for himself with regard to those things which pertain to divine or natural law. And then he should be led to the faith, not by compulsion but by persuasion, and he can also consent to the faith and be baptized when his parents are unwilling — not, however, before he has the use of reason.

Hence it is said of the children of parents in ancient times that they were saved in their parents’ faith, through which we are given to understand that it is up to the parents to provide for their children’s salvation, especially before they have the use of reason.

Therefore, to the first it must be stated that in the marriage bond each spouse has the use of free choice and each can assent to the faith when the other is unwilling. But this is not so with a child before he has the use of reason. The likeness holds after he has the use of reason, if he wants to be converted.

To the second it must be stated that no one must be taken away from temporal death against the order of the civil law. For example if someone is condemned to death by its judge, no one ought to rescue him violently. Neither then ought anyone violate the order of natural law by which a child is under his parents’ care in order to free him from the danger of eternal death.

To the third it must be said that the Jews are slaves of princes by a civil servitude which does not exclude the order of natural or divine law.

To the fourth it must be said that man is ordered to God through reason through which he can know God. So a child before he has the use of reason is ordered to God by a natural order through the reason of his parents to whose care he is naturally subject. And divine things must be done concerning him according to their disposition.

To the fifth it must be said that the danger following from neglected preaching threatens only him to whom the duty of preaching was committed. Hence in Ezekiel 33:7 he prefaces, “I gave you a watchman for the children of Israel.” However, with regard to the children of unbelievers, it is up to the parents to provide the sacraments of salvation. So the danger threatens them if their little ones suffer any harm to salvation because of being deprived of the sacraments.

Parallel passages: ST 2-2, q. 10, a.12; 3, q. 68, a.10.

Article 3: Whether some people can be excused from the law of paying tithes because of a custom?

On the third we proceed as follows: it seems that some people are excused from the law of paying tithes because of a custom. For there is more reason to receive tithes than there is not to give them. But because of a custom, in some lands some soldiers receive tithes and this is tolerated by the Church. Therefore, all the more are some people excused from paying tithes because of a custom, for are they obligated to pay them.

But to the contrary: divine law is not abolished because a custom is lacking. but tithes are owed because of a divine law, therefore the law requiring payment of tithes is not abolished through lack of a custom. Men are then bound to pay tithes, a contrary custom not with standing.

I answer: it must be said that those things which pertain to positive law are abolished through lack of a custom. But no lack of a custom can abolish those things which are from natural or divine law, for no lack of a custom can make it permissible to steal or commit adultery. Therefore, in connection with the proposed question we must consider whether giving tithes pertains to divine law or to positive human law.

Now divine law is contained in the New and Old Testaments. In the New Testament, no precept seems to be given concerning payment of tithes, either in evangelic or apostolic teaching. For what Matthew 23:23 says concerning the payment of tithes, “It was necessary to do these and not to omit those,” and what the Pharisee says in Luke 18:12, “I give tithes of all that I possess,” seem to pertain to the condition of the Old Testament rather than to impose a form of observance of the New Testament.

In the Old Testament, however, there was a threefold genus of precepts. Some were moral precepts, some judicial, some ceremonial. Moral precepts were engrafted in the natural reason to which men are obligated at all times — “Honor your father and mother,” “Do not commit adultery,” “Do not steal,” and the like. Judicial precepts are those through which trials were conducted, e.g., if someone steals one sheep he should return four, and such precepts are not engrafted in natural reason for natural reason does not hold that one who steals a sheep should return four rather than three or five, but rather a moral precept is determined through such precepts. Natural reason holds that one who steals ought to be punished, but that he be punished by such and such a punishment is determined through a judicial precept. Moreover, the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law are those which pertain to the observance of divine worship and were ordained to symbolize something future, just as the sacrifice of the paschal lamb symbolized the killing of Christ.

Therefore, we must consider whether the precept concerning the payment of tithes is moral, judicial, or ceremonial. For if it is moral, all are bound to it in all times, a contrary custom notwithstanding. But this does not seem to be the case because natural reason does not dictate that a man should give a tenth part to the ministers of God rather than an eleventh or a ninth part of the fruit of his labor. If it is a judicial precept, men are not bound to give tithes, just as all are not bound to judge according to the judgments written in the Old Law because those judicial precepts were specially given to those people with their conditions taken into account, for they do not settle things the same way for all. However, if it is a ceremonial precept it not only would not obligate but its observance would even lead to sin, for if someone sacrificed a paschal lamb he would sin because the symbols ceased after the coming of the Truth.

Therefore, we must say, as past teachers have done, that some precepts of the law are purely moral, such as “Do not kill,” “Do not steal.” Some are purely ceremonial such as the sacrifice of a paschal lamb and circumcision. And some are intermediate, moral in a way and ceremonial in a way, as the precept concerning the observation of the sabbath is moral as it concerns the allotment of a time of rest for freedom for divine matters, because natural reason maintains this; but the allotment of the seventh day is due to God’s determination for the sake of some symbol; hence this is a ceremonial precept.

So then the precept concerning the payment of tithes is indeed in some way a moral one in providing that they who are free for divine obedience for the whole people’s sake may be supported by the people’s stipends as also they who serve in other offices of the state are supported by the whole people. And this precept is proposed in the New Testament in this manner, for the Lord says in Matthew 10:10, “The worker is worthy of his food,” and the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 9:14, “The Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel live from the Gospel, and they who serve the altar live from the altar.” But a determined amount of tithes does not pertain to natural law nor is the precept a moral one, but it is ceremonial inasmuch as it is related to symbolizing something about Christ, or it is even judicial according to its suitability for that people among whom, because there was a multitude of ministers, there was need for such taxation for the support of God’s ministers.

Therefore, this common law, to provide for the ministers of God in the necessities of life, is from divine law like a moral precept, and from natural law. However, it is up to any prince who can establish laws to determine the natural common law through a positive law, for positive law is nothing but the determination of natural law. (For example, natural law holds that a malefactor should be punished, but that he be punished by a particular punishment is determined through a positive law). Therefore, because the Church has the power of establishing law in matters which pertain to the worship of God, the amount of what the people are to give the ministers of God could be determined by Church statute. And in order that there might be some agreement of the Old and New Testaments, the Church decreed that the taxation of the Old Testament be kept also in the New. Hence all are obliged to tithes willy nilly. The Church could, however, decree, if there were cause, either a greater or a lesser amount, e.g., that an eighth be given, or a twelfth, as well as that a tenth be given.

So no contrary custom frees a man from the obligation of paying tithes because this obligation is founded on divine and natural law.

Hence men are always bound to pay tithes if the Church demands, a contrary custom notwithstanding. And in the lands in which there is a custom that tithes be paid, the custom itself, as it were, demands the tithes, hence he who would not pay would sin. But in lands in which it is not the common custom that tithes be given and the Church does not require them, the Church seems to renounce them so long as it ignores them. And therefore, men in those lands do not sin in not giving tithes for it would be difficult to say that all the men of Italy ,and the Eastern parts who do not pay tithes would be damned.

And we can get such an argument from the Apostle who, when the necessities of life were due him by those to whom he preached, however did not take them nor did they sin who did not give to him, otherwise he had done wrongly by them in not taking them, especially since he himself says in Acts 20:27, “I have not evaded declaring to you every counsel of God.” Therefore, the Apostle did not demand what was due him lest some hindrance be given to the Gospel, as he himself says there. Hence the rectors of the churches would not do well if they demanded tithes in those lands in which it is not the custom for them to be given, if they believed with probability that they would give rise to a scandal from doing so.

Therefore, to that which is objected on the contrary side it must be said that soldiers who receive tithes in some lands do not have the right to do so for this right is a spiritual one owed the ministers of God; hence it does not fall on a lay person. But those temporal things which are demanded by the law are given some soldiers from a concession of the Church because of a service they performed for the Church; in the same way the Church can renounce those fruits of labor which are due as tithes but it does not renounce the right of demanding tithes nor remove the debt of paying them.

Parallel passages: Quodiibet 6, q. 5, a.4; In Matth., c. 23; Ad Hebr., c. 7, lects. 1,2; ST 2-2. q.87, al.

QUESTION 5: Then it was asked concerning these things which pertain to the virtues in relation to human affairs. And two questions were asked:

1. Whether a child is bound to obey his parents of the flesh in indifferent matters?

2. Whether a seller is bound to tell a buyer a defect in an item sold?

Article 1: Whether a child is bound to obey his parents of the flesh in everything?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that a child is bound to obey his parents of the flesh in everything.

1. For it is said in Deuteronomy 21:18-21, if a man begat an obstinate and shameless son who does not hear his mother’s or father’s command, the people of the city should strike him down with stones. Such a punishment would not be inflicted unless he sinned gravely by not obeying, so children are bound to obey their parents of the flesh in all things.

2. Moreover, the Apostle says in Colossians 3:21, “Children, obey your parents in all matters.”

3. Further. although affirmative moral precepts do not obligate for all times, it is yet never permissible to act contrary to them. But there is an affirmative moral precept concerning honoring one parents. Therefore it is not permissible to be irreverent to a parent, which would be the case if his command were not obeyed. Hence a child is bound to obey his parents in all things.

But to the contrary: spiritual parents must not be obeyed less but more than parents of the flesh, as the Apostle maintains in Hebrews 12:9. But subordinates are not bound to obey spiritual parents in indifferent matters, for religious who profess obedience are only bound to obey their prelates in those matters which are according to the Rule, as Bernard says in De dispensatione et praecepto. Therefore, neither are children bound to obey their parents of the flesh in indifferent matters.

I answer: it must be said that, since obedience is due a superior, the duty of obedience is extended as far as his authority. Now a father of the flesh first has authority over a child with regard to domestic life, for the head of the family is related to the home as a king to a realm; hence just as the king’s subjects are bound to obey him in those matters which pertain to the government of the realm, so are children and other domestic members bound to obey the head of the family in those matters which pertain to the management of the home. The father has authority secondly with regard to moral instruction. Hence the Apostle says in Hebrews 12:9, “Indeed we had fathers of the flesh who taught us and we revered them.” For the father owes the child not only upbringing but also instruction, as the Philosopher says. In these areas then the child is bound to obey his father of flesh. and not in others.

Therefore to the first it must be said that Moses speaks there of the paternal command which pertains to moral instruction, so in the same place it is said, “He despises to hear our counsels, he has leisure to devote himself to dissipation and reveling and riotous living.” (Deut. 21:20)

To the second it must be said that the Apostle says parents must be obeyed in ah matters to which their authority extends.

To the third it must be said he does not exhibit irreverence to one who gives rules if he does not obey him in those matters in which he is not bound to obey.

Parallel passages: sr 2-2, q. 104, a.5; In Ioann., c. 2, lect. 1; ,4d Rom., c. 13, lect. 1; Ad Tu., c. 3, lect. I.

Article 2: Whether a seller is bound to tell a buyer about a defect in an item sold?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that a seller is not bound to teil a buyer about a defect in an item sold.

1. Because according to civil laws, buyer and seller can deceive each other. But there could be no deception if a seller were bound to tell a buyer about a defect in an item sold. Therefore, he is not bound to do so.

2. But it was objected that the laws do not speak with regard to the court of conscience, and that we speak now according to a contentious court. To the contrary: according to the Philosopher in Ethica 6, 12, the lawmaker’s intention is to make good citizens. Therefore, what is permissible according to the laws is not contrary to virtue and so also is not contrary to conscience.

But to the contrary:

1. he is so obligated because according to civil laws, if someone sells a sickly animal he is obligated with respect to the defect. Hence he is bound to tell a buyer about the defect.

2. Moreover, Tully says in De officiis, 3, 15 that it is part of a good man’s duty to tell a buyer the reason for which a thing might be sold at a lower price. Now a defect in an item sold is such a reason, so a seller is bound to tell a buyer about a defect in an item sold.

I answer: it must be said that something pertains to the good of men to which men are not however bound, as it pertains to the good of men that one give his goods liberally to a friend although he is not bound to this. And something pertains to the good of men to which one is bound, namely that one pay someone what is just, for it is an act of justice that what is owed someone be paid him. And therefore, every seller is bound to make a just sale but not to make a liberal sale by giving up some of the just price.

Now justice is a kind of equality, as is said in Ethica 5, 2. There is therefore a just sale when the price received by the seller is equivalent to the thing sold, but there is an unjust sale if it is not equivalent but he receives more. So if a defect in the thing sold makes the thing worth less than the price imposed by the seller, the sale will be unjust hence he sins in hiding the defect. However, if it does not make the thing worth less than the price imposed, perhaps because the seller imposes a lower price because of the defect, then he does not sin in being silent about the defect because the sale is not unjust. And perhaps it would be detrimental to him if he did tell because the buyer would want to have the thing for an even lower price than it was worth. But he would act liberally if he held loss to himself in contempt in order that he might satisfy another person’s will, although he is not bound to do this.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that that statement of the law does not mean that it is permissible for a simple seller to deceive a buyer and conversely. But something is said to be permissible according to the law when it is not punished through the law, as a petition for divorce was permitted according to the Old Law.

To the second it must be said that the law’s precepts are capable of leading to perfect virtue. Now acts of perfect virtue do not fail under a precept of human law but human law prohibits some more serious sins in order that gradually men, having been drawn back from evils, may be conducted to virtue through their own persons. However, it permits some lesser sins and does not inflict punishment on them because the multitude of men is certainly not found without them, and among such is the deception between buyers and sellers for there are a great many who want to buy cheap and sell dear, as Augustine says in De trinitate, 13, 3.

Indeed to that which first is objected on the contrary side, it must be said that we must understand that to be the case when the disease of the beast makes it worth less than the price for which it is sold.

To the second it must be said that Tully says that a good man is not silent concerning a defect of an item sold because deceiving someone does not pertain to the good of men. But it is not deception if what he is silent about with regard to the thing sold does not make the thing worth less than the price he receives for it.

Parallel passage: ST 2-2, q. 77, a.3.

***

QUESTION 6: Then two questions were asked about sins:

1. Whether it is a sin to seek a ruling office?

2. Whether it is a sin for a preacher to have his eye on temporal matters?

Article 1: Whether it is a sin to seek a ruling office?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that it is a sin to seek a ruling office.

1. For it does not seem that we can seek without sin that which existed only in the state of corrupted nature and not in the state of innocence. Now ruling positions did not exist in the latter state but began to exist after the first sin when it was said to woman in Genesis 3:16, “You will be under the man’s power.” Therefore, it is a sin to seek a higher office.

2. Moreover, desire seems to concern those things which pertain to the state of future glory. Now in the future all ruling positions will cease, as the Glossa on 1 Cor. 15:24 says. Therefore, it is a sin to seek a ruling office.

But to the contrary: 1 Timothy 5:17 says, “Let eiders who rule well be held worthy of a double honor.” But it is not a sin to seek that for which honor is due when it is due only for virtue. Hence it is not a sin to seek a ruling office.

I answer: it must be said that Augustine solves this question in De civitate Dei 19, 19 where he says that a ruling office, without which the people cannot be governed, is not fittingly sought even if it be administered as is fitting, because he who seeks a ruling office is either proud or unjust. Now it is a matter of injustice for someone to want to take more honor for himself, either power or other goods, unless he is worthy of greater things, as is said in Ethica 5, 3, but it is a matter of pride and presumption for someone to esteem himself to be more worthy for a ruling office than all those over whom he takes office. Hence clearly whoever seeks a ruling office is either unjust or proud. And therefore, no one ought to succeed to a ruling office by his desire, but only by God’s judgment, according to what the Apostle says in Hebrews 5:4, “No one takes honor for himself except the one who is called by God as Aaron was.” But anyone is permitted to desire himself to be worthy of a runng office, or to desire the works of a good prelate for which honor is due.

Therefore, the response to the last argument is clear.

Indeed the first two arguments do not conclude rightly because even those things which did not exist in the state of innocence nor will exist in the state of glory can be permissibly sought, such as being subject to another, repentance, and the like (although ruling offices in some sense existed in the state of innocence and will exist in the state of glory as far as superiority of degree, and government or rule are concerned, but not as far as compulsory servitude is concerned).

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 6, q. 11, a.2; 12, q. il, a.3 De perfecr. vitae spirit., c. 19; 1 Tim., c. 3, lect. 1.

Article 2: Whether it is a sin for a preacher to have his eye on temporal matters?

On the second we proceeded as follows: it seems that it is a sin for a preacher to have his eye on temporal matters. For it is said in Luke 12:31, “Seek first the kingdom of God,” on which the Glossa says, “i.e., eternal goods,” “and all these will be added to you,” to which the Glossa adds, “even to those not seeking them.” Therefore, it is not permissible for a preacher to have his eye on temporal matters.

But to the contrary: 1 Cor. 9:10 says, “He who plows ought to plow in hope,” to which the Glossa adds, “of temporal stipends.” So it is permissible for a preacher, concerning whom it speaks there, to have his eye on temporal matters.

I answer: it must be said that having an eye on earthly things happens in two ways. In one way it happens with regard to payment or reward, and in this way it is not permissible for a preacher to have his eye on earthly things because he would then make the Gospel venal. In the other way it happens with regard to the stipends necessary to support life, and in this way it is permissible for a preacher to have his eye on earthly things. Hence on 1 Timothy 5:17, “Let the eiders that rule, etc.,” Augustine’s gloss says, “It is a matter of necessity to take the means of living, it is a matter of charity to supply them. However, the Gospel is not venal because of those who do, for if they so sell, they sell a great thing cheaply. Therefore, let them take the necessities of life from the people, and the reward of dispensation from the Lord.”

And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Parallel passages: ST 2-2, q. 100, a.3, ad 2; 4 Sent., d. 25, q.3, a.2, qc 2, ad 4; Ad Rom., c. 10, lect. 2.

The question that was asked concerns the punishments of sins — first with regard to the punishments themselves, second with regard to the remission of punishments.

QUESTION 7: Two questions were asked concerning punishments themselves:

1 whether a separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal Lire?

2. Whether one of two individuals worthy of the same punishment lingers longer in Purgatory than the other?

Article 1: Whether a separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal lire?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that a soul separated from the body cannot be acted upon by corporeal lire.

1. For according to the Philosopher De generatione et corruptione 1.6, things that do not touch each other do not act upon each other. Now corporeal fire does not touch a soul separated from the body since it does not have corporeal boundaries; however, things that touch each other have their boundaries together. Hence a separated soul is not acted upon by corporeal lire.

2. Moreover, those things that are acted upon by each other can be converted into each other. But the soul cannot be converted into corporeal lire nor conversely, so the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal lire.

3. Moreover, Bernard says that nothing burns in hell except the proper will. But the proper will, since it is something spiritual, cannot be the matter of corporeal lire. Therefore, a soul separated from the body cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.

But to the contrary: it says in Isaiah 66:24, “Neither shah their fire be quenched.”

I answer: it must be said that to be acted upon is spoken of in many ways. In the general sense, to be acted upon is the same as to receive, inasmuch as feeling and understanding are cases of being acted upon. And in this way a soul conjoined to a body is acted upon by corporeal things in sensing and understanding them, but whether it can be acted upon by corporeal things in this way when separated from the body is another question, because some say that the soul separated from the body, and even an angel, can receive cognition from sensible things. But even if this opinion were true, to be acted upon by sensing and understanding is to be perfected and not to be punished, unless perhaps accidentally inasmuch as what is sensed or understood is repugnant to the will. But sensing and understanding considered in themselves are not punitive. In the proper sense, being acted upon is an opposition of agent to patient, as we are said to be acted upon when something happens to us which is contrary to our nature or will. Weakness and sadness are said to be cases of being acted upon in this sense. And indeed to be acted upon in this sense can occur in two ways. It can occur through the receiving of a contrary form, as water is acted upon by fire inasmuch as lire heats it and consequently water’s natural quality is lessened. In this way a separated soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire because it cannot be heated or dried nor be changed according to any form or quality of corporeal fire. In the other way we say that all that is in any way kept from its proper impetus or inclination is acted upon, as we say a falling stone is acted upon when it is impeded in such a way that it cannot fal1 down, and as we say a man is acted upon when he is detained or bound so that he cannot go where he wants. And in this way, through a kind of binding the soul is acted upon by corporeal lire as Augustine says in De civitate Dei 21, 10 is not against nature for a spirit to be bound to a body since we see the soul naturally bound to the body to give it life. Demons also, through necromancy, are bound by the power of higher demons to some images or other things. All the more then can spirits be bound to corporeal fire by means of divine power, not so as to give life but so as to receive punishment, as Augustïne says.

But because what has lesser power cannot by its power bind that which has greater power, no body can bind a spirit, which has greater power, except by means of some higher power. And because of this it is said that corporeal fire acts upon a separated soul, not by its own power but insofar as it is an instrument of divine vindicating justice.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that fire touches the soul, not indeed by a mathematical contact which is understood according to quantitative boundaries, but rather by contact of a power not its own but which it has insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice.

To the second it must be said that that argument proceeds concerning the being acted upon which cornes through the reception of a contrary form.

To the third it must be said that the proper wil is said to burn in heu because it deserves the heat.

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 3, q. b, ai; 7, q. 5, a.3; ST 1, q. 64, a.4, ad l; c. 4, c. 90; Quaest. de anima, q. 6, ad 7; q. 2l;Spir. creat.. a.l, ad 20; De ver., q. 26, a.l; Comp. iheol., c. 180.

Article 2: Whether one of two persons who are worthy of the same punishment lingers longer in Purgatory than the other?

On the second we proceeded as follows: it seems that one of two persons who are deserving of equal punishment cannot be freed from Purgatory more quickly than the other.

1. For judgment after death is not of man but of God who judges according to the truth, as is said in Romans 2:2. But God would judge against the truth if a more severe punishment for the senses were inflicted on one of them who are deserving of equal punishment than on the other. Now delay of glory is a greater punishment than the painfulness of punishment for the senses because, as Chrysostom says in Super Matth., Homily, to be cut off from the divine vision is a greater punishment than any punishment for the senses. Therefore, one of those persons who are deserving of equal punishment cannot suffer a greater delay of glory than the other who is more quickly freed.

2. Further, according to Augustine something is called evil because it harms and it harms because it removes a good. Delay of glory, however, removes a greater good, namely an uncreated good, so it is a greater evil. And so the same as in argument.

But to the contrary:

3. The Master says in 4 Sent., d. 45, that he for whom many prayers are said is freed from Purgatory’s punishments more quickly. However, it happens that more prayers are said for one of them who are deserving of equal punishment than for the other. So one will be freed more quickly.

4. Moreover, at the end of the world are found some who have sins needing cleansing, whose delay from glory will not be as long as that of those who bring such sins to Purgatory, because the delay between death and resurrection will be short, as Augustine says. Hence for the same reason now also, one of those who bring equal sins can be delayed less from glory than the other and so he will be more quickly freed from the punishments.

I answer: it must be said that this question is founded on the power of prayers — whether prayers made for someone avail only for that person for whose liberation they are made, or for others also. Concerning this matter some said that they do not avail more for the former than for the others; rather they perhaps avail more for the others if these are better disposed to receive the power of the prayers. And they use an example: it is as if a candle lit in a home for a wealthy man who is blind gives light to all living in the house and perhaps gives more light to others if they have clearer vision. According to this opinion, one of two persons who are detained in Purgatory because of equal faults cannot be freed more quickly than the other.

But I do not regard this opinion as true because the prayer of one avails for another for two reasons. It avails in one way because of the unity of charity, because all who are in charity are like one body and just as the hand is devoted to the whole body and likewise to any member of the body, so the good of one redounds to all. Thus any good done by someone avails anyone who is in charity, according to Psalm 119 (118):63, “I am the companion of all who fear you and of those who keep your commandments.” It avails also in another way if someone’s act is transferred to another through his intention, for example if someone pays a debt for another person, because there is the same result as if that one had paid it for himself. So in the first way a good work avails through the manner of merit whose root is charity. But in the second way the work of one avails the other through the manner of satisfaction, since one can satisfy for another if the former so intends. And such value is understood to be in prayers which are made in order that through them men may be freed from the debt of punishment. And so we must say that prayers made in this latter manner avail only for those for whom they are made and, if many prayers are made for someone he is more quickly freed from the punishment of Purgatory than others for whom they are not made, even if they brought equal sins with them. But we must concede that prayers made for one avail for all inasmuch as all who know rejoice out of charity in the good things that are done out of charity. And in this sense it is true that the prayers avail more for those for whom they are not made if these have greater charity.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that the punishment of being cut off from the divine vision, either absolutely or for a time, is not as such (per se) due for a venial sin since it does not involve a turning away from God, but that some are delayed from the divine vision for a time happens accidentally, because as long as they are deserving of any punishment they cannot participate in the highest happiness which consists of the vision. Justice, howevers, considers a punish merit due as such (per se) for a sin, not however that which follows accidentally.

Through this the response to the second is clear.

We concede the third and likewise the fourth. However, those who are found alive at the end of the world will have few sins needing cleansing, having been purged by preceding tribulations. It will also be accomplished so that the painfulness of the punishment for a moderate amount of time makes up for the length of punishment in others.

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 7, q. 5. a.2; Suppl., q. 71 a. 12.

QUESTION 8: Two questions were asked concerning the forgiveness of sins:

1. Whether a sin against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable?

2. Whether a crusader who dies before he can take the journey across the sea has full forgiveness of sins?

Article 1: Whether a sin against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable?

On the first we proceed as follows: it seems that a sin against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable, for the dignity and majesty of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one. But a sin against the Son is not unforgivable, for Matthew 12:32 says. “Whoever has spoken a word against the son of man, it will be forgiven him.” So a sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgivable.

But to the contrary: it is said in the same place, “Whoever has spoken a word against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him either in this world or in the one to come.”

I answer: it must be said that a sin against the Holy Spirit has been spoken of in three ways. For teachers before Augustine understood a sin against the Holy Spirit to be a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit or its works, or even against the divinity of God the Father or the Son, because in the sense the Holy Spirit is also Father and Son, because God is spirit as John 4:24 says. However, they understand a sin against the Son of Man to be a blasphemy against Christ according to his human nature. And the Jews sinned against Christ in both ways. They sinned against him in the first way by attributing the miracles which he performed through the Holy Spirit and by the power of his divinity to the prince of demons. They sinned against him in the second way saying, “Behold, a gluttonous man, a drunkard, and a friend of publicans,” Matthew 11:19. Therefore, Chrysostom in sanctum Matthaeum evangelistam, Hom. 41, and Hom. 42. no. 3 calls this second blasphemy forgivable since they had an excuse because of the weakness of the flesh that they saw in Christ, but he calls the other blasphemy unforgivable because they had no excuse since they saw clear signs of the Holy Spirit and divinity. Because of this, according to him, this blasphemy was not forgiven those who persevered in it, either in this world or in the one to come, for in this world they were punished for it through the Romans, and in the one to come they will be tortured in hell.

According to Augustine, forgiveness of sins is attributed to the Holy Spirit which is the charity of the Father and the Son. There fore, he sins against the Holy Spirit or blasphemes who says the word in his heart, mouth, or work and who does this unrepentant to the end of his life in such a way that forgiveness of sins is not granted him. And then it is plain that this sin against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven either in this world or in the world to come.

Modem teachers indeed said that because power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit, a sin from weakness is a sin against the Father, a sin from ignorance is a sin against the Son, a sin from a fixed malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, because ignorance or weakness excuses a sin either wholly or partly, they say that a sin against the Father or the Son is forgiven because it either totally lacks fault or it lessens the fault. Malice indeed does not excuse a sin but makes it worse and therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven either wholly or partly because it does not have in itself any aspect of forgiveness to lessen the fault. And if it is sometimes forgiven this is due more to the pity of a forgiving God who cures even incurable diseases than to the remissibility of the sin.

And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Parallel passages: ST 2-2, q. 14, a.3; 3, q. 86, a.3, ad 2; 2 Sent., d. 43, a.4; De ver., q. 24, all, ad. 7; De malo, q. 3, a.15; In Matth., c. 12; Ad Rom., c. 2, lect. I.

Article 2: Whether a crusader who dies before he takes the journey across the sea has a plenary indulgence for his sins?

On the second we proceed as follows: it seems that a crusader who dies before he takes the journey has full indulgence for his sins.

1. For in order that an indulgence avail someone, it is required that he be truly penitent and confessed, as the papal letter says. Now a crusader who dies before he has taken the journey has all these things which are required according to the form of the letter for the receiving of full indulgence for his sins. Therefore, he receives it fully.

2. Further, only God forgives sins as far as the fault is concerned, so when the pope gives an indulgence for all sins this is not to be referred to the fault but to the totality of the punishments. Therefore, he who takes the cross according to the form of the papal letter will suffer no punishment for his sins and so he will ascend to heaven at once accompanied by full forgiveness of his sins.

But to the contrary:

3. Augustine says in De trinitate 14, 17 that removing the sword is not the same thing as healing the wound. For the sword of sin is removed through forgiveness of sin; however the wound is healed through the refashioning of God’s image which is accomplished through works of satisfaction. But the crusader who dies before taking the journey underwent no labor towards the refashioning of his image so the wound is not yet healed and he will not be able to arrive in glory at once before suffering the punishments of Purgatory.

4. Moreover, any priest uses such words: “I absolve you from all your sins.” Therefore, if the dying crusader should rise to glory, for the same reason so would any other person absolved by any priest. This is incoherent.

I answer: it must be said that, in order to clear up this question, the work of one person can satisfy for another to whom it is referred through the intention of the one performing it, as we said above in article 1. However, Christ shed his blood for his Church and did and suffered much else besides, the estimate of which is of infinite value because of the worth of the person suffering. Hence it is said in Wisdom 7:14 that “there is an infinite amount” in that “treasury for men.” Likewise, all the other saints had the intention in the things they suffered and did for God’s sake that these would not only be useful for them but also for the whole Church. Therefore, the whole treasury is in the dispensation of him who rules the universal Church, since the Lord committed to Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 16:19). So when the welfare or necessity of the Church itself demands this, he who rules the Church can share with someone who through charity becomes a member of the Church as much as seemed suitable to him from that infinite treasury, either to the total forgiveness of punishments or up to some determined quantity — and in such a way that the suffering of Christ and the other saints is imputed to this person as though the himself had suffered as much as sufficed for the forgiveness of his sins, just as happens when one satisfies for another, as we said.

Therefore, for indulgence to avail someone three things are needed:

first a cause pertaining to God’s honor or the Church’s necessity or welfare; second the authority in the one who grants indulgences, for the pope can do so principally and others can inasmuch as they receive either ordinary or committed, that is delegated power from him; third that he who wants to receive the indulgence be in a state of charity. And these three conditions are designated in the papal letter. For the appropriate cause is designated in what was premised concerning the aid of the Holy Land, the authority indeed in that mention is made of the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul and of the pope himself, the charity of the recipient in these words, “To all penitents and confessed people.” It does not say, “and those making satisfaction” because an indulgence does not excuse one from contrition and confession but takes the place of satisfaction.

Hence we must say to the question proposed that if, according to the form of the papal letter, an indulgence is conceded to those taking the cross in aid of the Holy Land, a crusader has an indulgence at once, even if he dies before he takes the journey. However, if it is contained in the form of the letter that an indulgence be given those who cross the sea, he who dies before he crosses lacks the cause of the indulgence.

Therefore, to the first it must be said that in this last case, that which is more principal. namely the cause of the indulgence, is lacking in the dying crusader.

To the second it must be said that only God forgives a fault through authority, but a priest does also by his ministry insofar as he confers a sacrament of the forgiveness of sins, for example in baptism or in penance. However, an indulgence is not extended for forgiveness of a fault because it is not something sacramental since it does not result from orders but jurisdiction. For a non priest can also grant an indulgence if it is committed to him to do so and therefore, the punishment is wholly remitted if the cause is there but not if it is wanting.

To the third it must be said that satisfaction is both punitive inasmuch as it is an act of vindictive justice, and also medicinal inasmuch as it is something sacramental. So an indulgence takes the place of satisfaction as punitive, because the punishment which another suffers is imputed to this person as though he himself had suffered, and therefore the guilty condition of punishment is removed. But it does not take the place of satisfaction as medicinal, because the propensities to commit sins which are left from a prior sin remain, and for the healing of these the labor of satisfaction is more necessary. And therefore, crusaders while they live must be counselled not to neglect works of satisfaction inasmuch as they preserve from future sins, although the guilty condition of punish merit be totally removed. Nor is any labor required for this because the labor of Christ’s suffering suffices. However, such preservation is not necessary for the dying, but only liberation from the guilty condition of punishment.

To the fourth it must be said that the priest’s saying “I absolve you from ah your sins,” is not related to punishment but to fault for the absolution of which he devotes his ministry. However, no one can be absolved from one fault without being absolved from all. Punishment can be dismissed totally or in particular — in particular indeed in sacramental absolution, totally in the spiritual grace of an indulgence, as the Lord says to an adulterous woman in John 8:11: “I will not condemn you. Go and sin no more.”

Parallel passages: Quodlibet 5, q. 7, a. 2; 4 Sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 3; qc 3, ad 2.